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ABSTRACT
Security awareness is very essential in securing intellectual property, in particular
internal corporate information assets and its “Knowledge”. The dynamic nature of
security attacks and the need to comply with government policies in protecting
organisation’s data has a major influence on seeing organisations focus on
strengthening against threats from the human element. This is a difficult challenge.
Organisations must have a degree of trust their employees. They must trust their
employees to interact responsibly as end-users with their information systems. They
must trust their employees who work as developers to work responsibly and be
motivated to develop systems with the organisations protection in mind. However
organisations cannot expect all its employees to be educated in security issues before
joining the organisation and therefore must take some responsibility for educating both
users and developers on security issues and ethics. Although many organisations do
have security policies and awareness programmes, many others don’t. Security
awareness programmes and policies have varying degrees of success. Therefore the
issue of how to improve the security awareness of all employees in organisations, and
end-users in particular, is a hot topic.
The project described in this dissertation identified user involvement in highlighting
and protecting against security-relevant issues as crucial to ensuring privacy and
security of organisational knowledge and corporate information assets. This project
investigated how to harness the power of users by developing a framework from which
a knowledge management system (KMS) was developed that provides a participatory
education approach to security issues. The results of an extensive literature review and
the views of security experts and non-experts were used to develop a web based
prototype KMS which was evaluated by a group of academic users in higher
educational institute in Tanzania. The results of this evaluation were then distributed to
security experts and top executives for assessment of using such a KMS to improve
security user awareness across the organisation.

Key words: Computer Systems Security, Security Awareness, Knowledge Management,
KMS, KMS-SAWA Framework and Prototype.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Foremost, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my supervisor Ms
Deirdre Lawless of the School of Computing at Dublin Institute of Technology. Her
wide knowledge in Knowledge Management and logical way of thinking has been of
great value to my dissertation.

I would also like to thank Mr. Damian Gordon for his interesting and challenging
seminars during the taught part of this course. He has always been more than willing to
answer my naïve questions in the preparation of this dissertation and acted as a good
friend along the way.

I would also like to thank Dr. Fred J. Mtenzi for his never ending encouragement and
support from day one in Ireland. Throughout this course and especially during the
project time he has been a source of encouragement and support of all kinds.

Finally, I would also like to express my deep appreciation to my parents. Their
continuous support throughout the course has inspired me with confidence, patience
and persistence to successful accomplish the course.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1

2

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1

BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 1

1.2

RESEARCH PROBLEM ............................................................................................................... 2

1.3

INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE .................................................................................................... 2

1.4

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 3

1.5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 4

1.6

RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................. 5

1.7

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................................... 6

1.8

ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION .................................................................................... 7

COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY ......................................................................................... 9
2.1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 9

2.2

COMPUTER SYSTEMS BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 10

2.3

KEY ISSUES IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY ..................................................................... 12

2.3.1

Confidentiality ................................................................................................................. 13

2.3.2

Integrity ........................................................................................................................... 15

2.3.3

Availability....................................................................................................................... 15

2.3.4

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability ............................................................................. 16

2.4
2.4.1

Motivation of Computer Attackers ................................................................................... 18

2.4.2

Categories of threats........................................................................................................ 18

2.4.2.1

Outside threats ............................................................................................................ 19

2.4.2.2

Inside threats............................................................................................................... 21

2.5

COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY CONTROLS ........................................................................... 23

2.5.1

The First Wave - Technical .............................................................................................. 25

2.5.2

The Second Wave – Management .................................................................................... 27

2.5.3

The Third Wave - Institutionalisation .............................................................................. 28

2.6
3

COMPUTER SYSTEMS THREATS .............................................................................................. 16

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 29

SECURITY AWARENESS ......................................................................................................... 30
3.1

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 30

3.2

WHAT IS SECURITY AWARENESS? .......................................................................................... 31

3.2.1

Security awareness - Defined .......................................................................................... 31

3.2.2

Relationship between security awareness, training and education ................................. 33

3.3

SECURITY AWARENESS BUILDING PROCESS ........................................................................... 34

3.3.1

Getting started ................................................................................................................. 35

3.3.2

Establishing a Baseline.................................................................................................... 36

3.3.3

Communication ................................................................................................................ 37

3.3.4

Evaluation ........................................................................................................................ 37

iv

3.4
3.4.1

Security awareness in employment agreements ............................................................... 39

3.4.2

Face-to-face security awareness programme .................................................................. 40

3.4.3

Security awareness tools .................................................................................................. 40

3.4.4

Security awareness games ............................................................................................... 42

3.4.5

Web-based approaches .................................................................................................... 43

3.5

National campaign on security awareness ...................................................................... 44

3.5.2

National Centre for Technology in Education ................................................................. 45

3.5.3

Internet Advisory Board................................................................................................... 45

3.6

SECURITY AWARENESS IN TANZANIA .................................................................................... 46

3.7

FAILURE OF CURRENT SECURITY AWARENESS-FINDINGS ....................................................... 47

3.7.1

Material delivered to audiences....................................................................................... 47

3.7.2

Mode of material delivery ................................................................................................ 47

3.7.3

Organisational security culture ....................................................................................... 48

3.7.4

Organisational culture..................................................................................................... 49
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 49

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS .......................................................................... 51
4.1

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 51

4.2

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT................................................................................................. 52

4.2.1

Knowledge Management processes ................................................................................. 55

4.2.2

Knowledge transformation process ................................................................................. 58

4.3

ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING ................................................................................................ 61

4.3.1

What is organisational learning? .................................................................................... 62

4.3.2

Senge’s organisational learning process ......................................................................... 63

4.3.3

Communities of Practice .................................................................................................. 65

4.4

COMPUTING FOR KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ..................................................................... 68

4.4.1

Computing overview ........................................................................................................ 69

4.4.2

How do employees communicate their problems? ........................................................... 72

4.4.3

How is the shared knowledge going to be captured for reuse? ....................................... 72

4.5

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS .................................................................................. 73

4.5.1

Types of Knowledge Management Systems ...................................................................... 74

4.5.2

Selecting appropriate tools KMS ..................................................................................... 75

4.6
5

SECURITY AWARENESS IN IRELAND....................................................................................... 44

3.5.1

3.8
4

CURRENT SECURITY AWARENESS APPROACHES..................................................................... 39

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 77

THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY AWARENESS . 79
5.1

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 79

5.2

WHY IS SECURITY AWARENESS A KM PROBLEM? ................................................................ 79

5.3

ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE ................................................................................. 80

5.3.1

NIST’s Security Learning Continuum .............................................................................. 81

5.3.2

Microsoft Security Learning Cycle .................................................................................. 84

v

5.4
6

SECURITY USER AWARENESS SURVEY ............................................................................ 87
6.1

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 87

6.2

AUDIENCES ........................................................................................................................... 87

6.3

METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 88

6.4

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN ....................................................................................................... 89

6.5

SURVEY RESULTS ANALYSIS................................................................................................. 92

6.5.1

ICITST Seminar survey results ........................................................................................ 93

6.5.2

Tanzanian’s survey results............................................................................................... 96

6.5.3

Online survey results ..................................................................................................... 101

6.5.4

General survey results ................................................................................................... 104

6.6

Interview design ............................................................................................................. 108

6.6.2

Interviewee contributions .............................................................................................. 109
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS....................................................................................................... 110

6.7.1

Poor user involvement in security decisions .................................................................. 110

6.7.2

Computer security perceptions ...................................................................................... 110

6.7.3

E-mail as a major security awareness approach ........................................................... 111

6.7.4

Narrowness of awareness programme(s) ...................................................................... 111

6.8

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 111

KMS-SAWA FRAMEWORK AND PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION ........................ 112
7.1

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 112

7.2

FACTORS FOR KMS IMPLEMENTATION FOR SECURITY AWARENESS ................................... 112

7.2.1

Technological maturity .................................................................................................. 112

7.2.2

Organisational security culture ..................................................................................... 114

7.2.3

Organisational culture................................................................................................... 114

7.3

INITIAL KMS-SAWA FRAMEWORK .................................................................................... 115

7.4

KMS-SAWA FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTIONS .......................................................................... 117

7.4.1

1st Phase of implementation ........................................................................................... 119

7.4.2

2nd Phase of implementation .......................................................................................... 120

7.4.3

3rd Phase of implementation .......................................................................................... 121

7.4.4

Summary of why KMS-SAWA framework is a solution .................................................. 121

7.5

8

SUPPORTING INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................... 108

6.6.1

6.7

7

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 86

PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................................ 122

7.5.1

Prototype descriptions ................................................................................................... 123

7.5.2

Prototype testing ............................................................................................................ 126

7.6

EVALUATION ....................................................................................................................... 127

7.7

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 129

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 131
8.1

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 131

vi

8.2

RESEARCH DEFINITION & RESEARCH OVERVIEW ............................................................... 131

8.3

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ................................................................. 132

8.4

EXPERIMENTATION, EVALUATION AND LIMITATION ........................................................... 133

8.5

FUTURE WORK & RESEARCH .............................................................................................. 135

8.6

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 135

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................ 136
APPENDIX A....................................................................................................................................... 143
APPENDIX B ....................................................................................................................................... 152
APPENDIX C....................................................................................................................................... 153

vii

TABLE OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY AND AVAILABILITY ......................... 13
FIGURE 2: TREND OF INTERNET VULNERABILITIES ................................................................................... 17
FIGURE 3: SUMMARY OF SECURITY CONTROL WAVES .............................................................................. 25
FIGURE 4: THE PROCESS FOR BUILDING SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMME ......................................... 36
FIGURE 5: SCREENSHOT OF TALC ANTI-PHISHING TOOL ........................................................................ 41
FIGURE 6: SCREENSHOT OF ANTI- PHISHING PHIL GAME ......................................................................... 42
FIGURE 7: KNOWLEDGE CYCLE ................................................................................................................ 56
FIGURE 8: SPIRAL OF KNOWLEDGE ........................................................................................................... 59
FIGURE 9: COP LIFECYCLE ....................................................................................................................... 67
FIGURE 10: C3S MODEL ........................................................................................................................... 71
FIGURE 11: PRODUCT-SERVICE KMS SUPPORT MODEL .......................................................................... 76
FIGURE 12: SECURITY LEARNING CONTINUUM ........................................................................................ 83
FIGURE 13: INFORMATION SECURITY LEARNING LIFECYCLE ..................................................................... 85
FIGURE 14: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT BASED ON COUNTRY ........................................................... 94
FIGURE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF AWARENESS APPROACHES ........................................................................ 95
FIGURE 16: BREADTH OF SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMME ............................................................... 96
FIGURE 17: RESPONDENTS' EXPERIENCE BASED ON ROLE AND QUALIFICATION ........................................ 97
FIGURE 18: DISTRIBUTION OF END-USERS IN OPERATING COMPUTER SYSTEMS ........................................ 98
FIGURE 19: DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SECURITY AWARENESS APPROACHES .................................................... 99
FIGURE 20: DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS IN ORGANISATIONS ............ 100
FIGURE 21: RESPONDENTS BY COUNTRY ................................................................................................ 102
FIGURE 22: USERS' INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT ............................................................. 103
FIGURE 23: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USERS' INVOLVEMENT AND POLICY ADHERENCE .......................... 103
FIGURE 24: USER INVOLVEMENT IN SECURITY DECISIONS ...................................................................... 105
FIGURE 25: THE GAP OF COMPUTER SECURITY BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ..... 106
FIGURE 26: DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY AWARENESS APPROACHES ....................................................... 107
FIGURE 27: BREADTH OF AWARENESS PROGRAMMES ............................................................................ 108
FIGURE 28: INITIAL KMS-SAWA FRAMEWORK .................................................................................... 116
FIGURE 29: KMS - SAWA FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 118
FIGURE 30: KNOWLEDGE CAPTURING: ATTACHMENTS .......................................................................... 124
FIGURE 31: SAWA-KMS PHISHING ATTACKS PAGE .............................................................................. 125
FIGURE 32: SAWA-KMS THREADS DASHBOARD ................................................................................... 126
FIGURE 33: CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ....................................................................................................... 128
FIGURE 34: ACTIVITY GRAPH ................................................................................................................. 129

viii

TABLE OF TABLES
TABLE 1: FIVE GENERATIONS OF COMPUTERS ......................................................................................... 10
TABLE 2: AWARENESS, TRAINING AND EDUCATION - COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK ................................ 34
TABLE 3: TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE ............................................................................................................. 54

ix

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Organisational information architectures are becoming increasingly more complex.
This need for complexity introduces more bugs that can be exploited to breach
corporate security. High demand for system interoperability and so called user friendly
interfaces has introduced a new layer of threats and attacks to modern information
systems architectures. In addition, the openness of Internet has brought new challenges
in protecting organisations’ intellectual property and information assets (Herold 2005).
Organisations are also constantly busy acquiring the so called sophisticated security
tools and applications to fight against these threats (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). However,
technology is unpredictable parameter and relying on technological assistance for
security is not sufficient. The focus should be wider and the least organisations can do
to control information systems security is to interweave what they already know,
knowledge sharing, to assist with improving organisational security informing all
members of the organisation.

The tight technological security controls that are being deployed within organisations
have changed attackers’ attention to end-users who are mostly not aware or ignorant of
security measures (Smith 2003). Though software developers also pose a big threat in
computer security, this dissertation will only concentrate with end-users. With
software security paradigm, developers are much away in security ethics than endusers (McGraw 2004). Therefore, in this dissertation end-users are considered more
susceptible and therefore pose a significant point of danger when considering
protecting organisations’ intellectual property and information assets. To at least
control the danger from the growing nature of digital threats, increased focus should be
directed to human element, in particular end-users. Good users’ understanding on
security principles is a stepping stone for the successfulness of security measures and
organisation as well (Arce 2003; Trcek 2006).

However it is not as simple as just introducing education programme, the challenges
remain on how to determine what users require to be aware of, and how to integrate
1

and make accessible security experts’ knowledge to all end-users within the
organisation without affecting their productivity. The approach adopted in this project
builds on the definition that Knowledge Management System (KMS) is an information
system that aims to facilitate the codification, collection, integration, and
dissemination of organisational knowledge (Bernard 2006). As such the project aims to
investigate where using a KMS could assist with improving security awareness. In this
dissertation, the KMS developed plays dual roles, firstly to store and communicate
security related knowledge contents and secondly to allow users to compare their
security-relevant activities with security policies and to either suggest on security
policy amendments or additions to training programmes.

1.2 Research problem
Many researchers emphasise on the involvement of employees in security awareness
programme (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002; Desman 2002; Herold 2005). On the
other hand, central to the improvement of organisational performance is employees’
contributions.

Therefore, since KM recognises the contributions employees have in improving
organisational performance, this project will investigate possible KM processes and
KMS features to improve organisational security awareness.

The primary aim of this project was to investigate users’ awareness in security issues
and the usefulness of KMS in improving security user awareness thereafter to develop
a framework that leverages KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational
context. From this framework a prototype KMS is developed.

1.3 Intellectual challenge
To achieve the aim of this project, an investigation of the roles of users play in
computer security and security awareness was necessary so as to build insights on the
trend of computer threats as associated with users, and the efforts organisations
undertake to equip their users with necessary skills to fight against these threats.
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Moreover, an investigation on Knowledge Management was conducted to ascertain the
possible knowledge activities that are appropriate in improving users’ awareness in
computer security related issues and the fundamental characteristics of KMS, their
usage and implementation requirements. An investigation of KMS was conducted to
assess their feasibility in improving security awareness in an organisational context.
Following this investigation, appropriate features of KMS were highlighted for the
improvement of users’ security awareness.

Finally, building on highlighted features of KMS, a Wiki based prototype was
developed to assess the contributions of KMS in improving users’ security awareness.

1.4 Research objectives
The following objectives have been achieved throughout the dissertation and
contributed to the overall outcome:

1. Review of computer security and security awareness approaches.
An extensive literature review of computer security and security awareness
approaches was conducted to analyse the trend of computer threats regarding to
users and the efforts organisations undertook in educating users.
2. Investigate users’ involvement in computer security.
An investigation of users’ involvement in computer security was conducted to
analyse the roles users play in computer security. To accomplish this, the survey
was created based on the results of a literature review of computer security and
security awareness.
3. Investigate Knowledge Management and KMS.
An extensive literature review on Knowledge Management and KMS was
conducted to analyse their feasibility in improving security awareness.
4. Develop a

framework for implementing KMS to improve security

awareness
An open framework was developed to assist organisations when implementing
KMS to improve security awareness. The framework was evaluated by security
experts to analyse its applicability within an organisational context.
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5. Develop and evaluate a Knowledge Management System prototype.
A Wiki based KMS was developed to assess the contributions of KMS in
improving security awareness. The prototype was then evaluated by both
security experts and end-users.

1.5 Research methodology
To successful accomplish the above objectives both primary and secondary research
was conducted. Primary research included both questionnaires and interviews.
Secondary research concentrated on extensive literature review.

Beginning with the secondary research, an extensive literature review was conducted
in the field of computer security and security awareness to investigate current
situations on computer threats as associated with users and the efforts organisations
undertake to educate their users.

Following the results obtained from the literature review of computer security and
security awareness, a primary research was conducted to investigate the roles users
play in computer security and the contributions of current security awareness
programmes into educating users.

This primary research was questionnaire-based survey covering many countries in the
world. The targeted audiences were security experts and organisational users. The
survey involved both physical distribution of questionnaires and online survey.
Thereafter an interview with security experts was conducted to evaluate the findings.

Parallel to security awareness survey, an extensive literature review on Knowledge
Management and KMS was also conducted to ascertain appropriate knowledge
management activities and key features of KMS that can be useful in improving
security awareness.

Following the results from literature reviews and security awareness survey, security
awareness was mapped as a knowledge management problem. Thereafter, a framework
was developed to guide organisations in building KMS for improving security
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awareness. To evaluate the applicability of the framework, an interview with security
experts was conducted.

Finally, a KMS prototype was developed using Wiki collaborative tool. Security
experts were invited to evaluate its implementation process by suggesting on the look
and feel of its contents. Thereafter users, specifically from Africa, were invited to
participate in the Wiki for a period of two weeks and thereafter to evaluate its
contribution on users’ understanding on computer security issues.

1.6 Resources
To successful accomplish this project both technical and non-technical resources were
essential. Below is the list and briefly explanation of each category:
 Technical resources
1. Personal computer
Availability of personal computer, specifically laptop, with full installed word
processing and analytical applications was essential for the documentation of
this dissertation.
2. Online survey tool
Accessibility of online survey tool, http://www.group-surveys.com, was also
essential in successful accomplishment of this project. The tool was useful in
conducting online survey.
3. Online Wiki tool
Accessibility of online Wiki tool, http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com, was necessary
for the successful accomplishment of this project. The tool was useful on the
development of Knowledge Management System prototype.
4. Internet access
Accessibility to internet was vital on the completion of this project. Besides its
facilitation in literature survey, internet acted as focal resource for the
successful completion of this project. Firstly, it assisted in routine
communications with project supervisor, and security experts. It also acted as
access point for online survey and Wiki tools.
5

 Non-technical resources
1. Library access
Access to library facilities was necessary for the successful completion of this
project for conducting extensive literature survey. This included both physical
and online accessibility. Physical accessibility was for literature reviewing on
books and previous dissertations, while online was useful for accessibility of
electronic journals.
2. Industrial contacts
Accessibility of industrial contacts for security experts was necessary
throughout this project to assist in the evaluation of survey results, framework
and KM System prototype.
3. Project Supervisor
Accessibility to project supervisor was vital for successful completion of this
project. Project Supervisor was on the centre of this project by providing access
to security experts who played central role in this project. Moreover, project
supervisor provided assistance in coherence of the document.

1.7 Scope and limitations
The world is so large and is made up of different organisations with different cultures.
Finding the true view of security awareness of all organisations could involve an
extensive survey and interviews. However, due to time limitation this project focused
on a subset of security experts who were accessible and users in Ireland and East
Africa. Although the findings cannot be considered definitive for every organisation
they still can be considered interesting and useful for those interested in assessing their
security awareness. In addition it offers new insights into the current state of security
awareness in higher education in East Africa.
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1.8 Organisation of the dissertation
The remaining chapters of this research project are organised as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses computer systems security. The aim of this chapter is to
investigate the trend of computer security threats and their control measures related to
users. The chapter starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the
discussion of computer systems background. The third section provides the discussion
of three key issues in computer systems security. The fourth section provides the
discussion of computer systems threats. The last section provides a discussion of three
computer systems security controls; technical, management and institutionalisation.
The chapter concludes by outlining users’ influences in ensuring computer security and
the effects of technological control measures.

Chapter 3 focuses on security awareness. The aim of this chapter is to investigate
current security awareness programmes and the involvement of users. The chapter
starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the definition of security user
awareness. The third section provides security awareness building process followed by
the discussion of current security awareness approaches. The fifth section provides the
discussion of security awareness in Ireland followed by the security awareness in
Tanzania. The last section provides the review on the failure of the current security
awareness.

Chapter 4 focuses on knowledge management systems. The aim of this chapter is to
investigate key processes of knowledge management and appropriate features of KMS
in improving security awareness. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then
followed by the discussion of knowledge management. The discussion of
organisational learning will be provided in section three. Section four provides the
discussion of computing for knowledge management. The discussion about KMS will
be provided in the fifth section. The chapter concludes by highlighting key knowledge
management processes and key KMS features that can be useful in improving security
awareness in an organisational context.
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Chapter 5 focuses on knowledge management perspectives on security awareness. The
aim of this chapter is to show how KMS can be useful in improving security
awareness. The chapter starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the
explanation of why security awareness is a knowledge management problem. The third
section provides the discussion of organisational security culture where NIST learning
continuum and Microsoft security learning cycle will be discussed.

Chapter 6 provides security awareness survey. The aim of this chapter is to investigate
the roles users play in computer security and the effectiveness of current security
awareness programmes. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then followed by
the discussion of audiences. The third section provides the discussion of survey
methodology. Questionnaire design will be explained in the fourth section followed by
the survey results analysis on the fifth section. The sixth section describes supporting
interviews then followed by summary of the findings. The chapter concludes by
outlining the level of users’ involvement in security issues and the effectiveness of
current security awareness programmes.

Chapter 7 describes the KMS-SAWA framework and prototype implementation and
evaluation process. The chapter will be introduced before the discussion on the factors
for the KMS implementation for security awareness. The third section provides the
discussion of initial KMS-SAWA framework. The fourth section will provide the
KMS-SAWA framework descriptions. Prototype implementation will be described in
the fifth section followed by its evaluation process in the sixth section. The chapter
concludes by outlining the key benefits of KMS-SAWA framework and KMS has in
improving security awareness.

Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the dissertation. The aim of this chapter is to give the
reader an overview of the research project by pointing out key elements and suggesting
future work. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then followed by the
definition and overview of the research. The third section describes the contributions to
the body of knowledge. Experimentation, evaluation and limitations will be explained
in section 5 then followed by the suggestion of future work and research. The chapter
concludes by outlining key findings of the project and their possible solutions.
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2

COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY

2.1 Introduction
There is no doubt on the benefits computer systems and its applications have brought
to our life. Large storage space, high processing speed and the pervasive nature of
computer systems are among the functionalities that have enabled us to do things
which to us were previously unimaginable. The Internet has completely changed the
way we communicate. It has made the world in a single village where you can talk and
chat all over the world cheaply. E-commerce and its applications have introduced new
business opportunities that have attracted a plethora of computer users.

It is now the reality for all organisations, of any size, that the use of computer systems
and internet technology is essential to the success of their day-to-day business
operations. Unfortunately, all these benefits come with security burden. As technology
advances, it brings with it a number of vulnerabilities. The complex nature of
applications, the demand for the interoperability of devices and systems, the portable
nature of devices and the demand for distributed environments have contributed to
making digital life miserable and pose significant challenges for organisations.

Individuals and organisations are now enjoying the evil side of technology. Many
technological and managerial controls have been implemented to fight against these
evil spirits but still they are suffering. The battle between bad guys and good guys is an
endless battle. While one end succeeds, the other end changes the tactics. Although the
investigation of KMS to improve security awareness is the focal point of this
dissertation, central to achieving this is establishing a clear picture of what exactly is
involved in computer security, examining the issues from a number of perspectives.
You can only with the battle when you know how your opponent operates.

This chapter presents a short review of computer security and its evolution to become a
mainstream topic of importance to all organisations. The variety and complexity of
issues which fall under the umbrella of computer security are discussed and the
challenges they present to organisations are assessed from an organisational
9

perspective. The chapter concludes by identifying the security issues which are
recognised in the literature as those of most importance to modern organisations.

2.2 Computer systems background
In their very beginning, computers where meant to handle well-structured jobs such as
scientific or transaction calculations that were difficult for human beings (S. Gupta &
Mccabe 1987). These computers were built by vacuum tubes; they were very huge in
size and their speeds were relatively slow. Those were the days when multitasking was
merely a nightmare and the only interactions with computers were through punched
cards (Lubbes 1993). During those days, computer security was not a headache; the
main concern was physical security of computer room. Table 1 presents the summary
for computer systems evolution.

Hardware
Generation

Software

Technology

Example
Systems

Methodology

Examples

1st
Generation
1950’s

Vacuum tubes

ENIAC,
WHIRLWIND

Binary

0,1
(machine
specific)

2nd
Generation
Early 1960’s

Transistors

IBM 709

Assembly

Assembly
(machine
specific)

3rd
Generation
Late 1960’s

Integrated
circuits

PDP 11

High-level
languages

FORTRAN, Numbers
Pascal,
and some
PL/1
text

4th
Generation
1970’s

Large
scale IBM
370; Elementary
integration
AMDAHL
information
470
systems

5th
Generation
Mid-1980’s

Hardware
Yet to come
implementation
of traditional
software
functions, truly
user-friendly
systems

IMS, SQL

High
level Yet to come
decision
support systems

Principal
kind of
Data
Handled
Binary
numbers
numbers

Numbers,
text
Number,
text,
video

Table 1: Five Generations of Computers
(Adapted from (A. Gupta & Toong 1984))
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As shown in table 1, the second generation of computer systems was built on
transistors. However, this turned out to be unsuccessful because the acquisition cost
was relatively high. This led to the emergence of new breed of computer systems. In
1960s, the third computer generation was introduced. Computers in this generation
were built with small scale integrated circuits where one “IC” replaced several
transistors (Tanenbaum 2008, p.13). This was relatively cheap and attracted more
people into the world of digital life. Despite of its acquisition cost, computers in this
generation came along with a lot of magic. Multiprogramming, spooling and
multitasking are among these wonders which provide a comfortable room for
networking.

Unfortunately, technology is not stagnant. The more wonders it brings, the more
insecure we are. In early 1970s, when microprocessors were introduced, things started
to slip. The ability to compress multiple functions into a single chip enabled personal
computers to be built at lower costs that were affordable to almost everyone (A. Gupta
& Toong 1984). Besides attracting many users, it also introduced another layer of
security threats; device malfunctioning. This was the era of fault-tolerance where
system availability was measured based on the cost of the system and its functional
criticality (Siewiorek & Swarz 1998, p.4). .

Moreover, as the main memory and processor speed increased, the demand for more
functionality also increased (S. Gupta & Mccabe 1987). This resulted to more complex
application programs with thousands of line of codes. Unfortunately, as applications
grow in line of codes, chances of having software bugs also increases (Tanenbaum
2008, p.11). It is through the exploitation of these bugs that attackers are able to launch
their attacks. In fact, above all these threats, with exception of social engineering,
software bugs are the catalysts for attackers’ malicious events (McGraw 2004).

As technology advances, computer systems become ever cheaper and hence attract
more users who mostly are not necessarily highly computer literate. Things became
even worse in 1990s when internet and its twin-brother (WWW) were introduced
(Mowery & Simcoe 2002). Together, they brought many benefits that organisations
and individuals could not resist. The introduction of e-business, social networks and
online gaming have attracted even more users. With the increase in customers,
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organisations need to provide their services twenty-four hours. All these had happened
so fast to make the issue of security an after thought (Straub & Welke 1998, p.3).

Technology is not stagnant, the more wonders it brings, the more insecure we are.
Computer threats evolve the same way as technology evolves. It is because of this
technology that our digital life now is miserable. It has engulfed us to the extent we
can not retreat and yet it has not promised our safety. Therefore, it now is a crucial
moment when knowing what exactly underlies computer security is essential to
determine the necessary means of tossing the other side of the coin to ensure improved
safety.

2.3 Key Issues in Computer systems security
There is no doubt about the wonders computer systems have brought to our life. Early
from its dawn, computer systems enabled us to do scientific calculations that were
iron-line to human brains. Those were the days where only few people had a direct
access with it. However, technology is not stagnant. As technology began its pace, the
cost of building computer systems drastically decreased. This changed the scope of
computer systems. Much functionality were demanded to suit the flexibility nature of
business. Unfortunately, technology has equal opportunities to anybody. As it
advances, it attracted another category of beneficiaries. Therefore, it is now a crucial
for organisation to turn their head and consider the negative side of computer systems.

Stallings (2006, p.3) defines computer security as security of computer systems against
any malicious events. These events generalise both human intruders and anything that
associate with it (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.8). Furthering the scope of computer
security, Andress (2003, p.5) argues that security is a three parameter process;
technology, people and process. Technology readiness provides computer security with
sophisticated control measures against malicious events. The process determines how
security should be exercised within the organisation while people are the one who
should practice security principles to ensure computer security.

The discipline of computer security is so wide, it can take years to tackle every niche
of it. However, to avoid the trivialness side of it and to welcome the clarity side, this
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section will only tackle computer security in three dimensions as proposed by Bishop
(2003, p.4). Bishop argues that computer security spans into three concepts;
confidentiality, integrity and availability, see figure 1. Therefore, this section will
explore the broadness of these concepts in relation to computer security and their
effects in organisational context.

Figure 1: Relationship between Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
(Source: (C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.11))

2.3.1 Confidentialit y
The explanation of this aspect differs depending on the context they arise. Bishop
(2003, p.4) defines confidentiality as the process of concealing the accessibility of
information resources from an unauthorised access while on the other hand, network
gurus define confidentiality as a process of concealing the transmitted data from being
intercepted by intruders (Stallings 2006, p.18). However, all these definitions have
common aim of prevention of unauthorised access to information resources. Due to
high sensitivity of their information and need of classified information, military
defence is renowned as the antecedent of this aspect (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.28).

Many researchers argue that the successfulness of organisation relies on how well it
utilise its intangible resources to create new ideas and innovations (Alavi 1997; Hahn
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& Subramani 2000; Lang 2001; Stenmark 2002). However, they overlooked a crucial
bit of protecting these ideas and innovations. For instance, suppose the marketing and
sales team of Vodafone had managed to harness whatever their staffs has to come up
with a new strategy of cutting down their call rates to attract more customers however
security was overlooked and no proper security control measures implemented. Their
rival O2 came across the ideas and launched the offer before they could. What do you
think will happen, will Vodafone still execute their strategy as they expected?

This concludes that the issue of confidentiality is not only a military issue. As it is
badly required by military to protect their missiles’ technology, so are financial and
other organisations in protecting their intellectual properties (Randeree 2006; Cole et
al. 2008). This emphasises that for any organisation to be successful it should know
how to leverage what employees’ have as well as to provide necessary protection to
their intelligence. Unfortunately, many of mechanisms to ensure confidentiality relies
on human being who are required to secretly handle their account passwords or an
encryption key .

Moreover, the issue of confidentiality has gained more popularity in the domain of
medicine (Siegler 2006). The demand for improving effectiveness and efficiency of
health care services by providing a lifelong storage, twenty-four hours and public
access of patients’ records have came along with risks of confidentiality of patients’
information (McClelland & Thomas 2002). All these come by introducing
sophisticated technologies that needs to be operated by professionals who are not
native of medical domain (Siegler 2006, p.598).

However, this does not mean that other organisations are safe from confidentiality
issue. Other organisations like financial institutions, education, transportation, and any
organisations, are the victims of system failures, data and money theft and all sorts of
evils due to failure of enforcing confidentiality. Military, Telecommunication and
Medicine organisations have been used in this section to elaborate the danger that
might occur due to violation of confidentiality.
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2.3.2 Integrit y
If we can not guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information at least we have to
validate the originality of that information. According to Janczewski and Colarik
(2005, p.2) data integrity is protecting message from unauthorised modifications.
Moreover, Caroll (1996, pp.369-374) defines data integrity as assurance of the
trustworthiness of data. This is very essential attribute when it comes to internet and
data storage as well. Customers need to be sure of what they send and receive through
the communication channel while on the other hand financial institutions focus on data
error cleaning to reduce noisy data.

Moreover, Zhou and Haas (1999) argue that message integrity can be violated by
“radio propagation impairment” and malicious attacks. However, for the purpose of
this dissertation, only violations based on malicious attacks will be considered.
Working with integrity is different from working with confidentiality. In
confidentiality the data is either compromised or not, but in integrity it involves the
correctness of the data; from whom the information is from, how well the data was
handled before reaching destination machine and how is being protected in the current
machine (Bishop 2003, p.5).

However, it is very difficult to guarantee data trustworthiness with human element
(Lee et al. 2002). The field of integrity is also very active in database management
systems (DBMS) and data mining as well. In DBMS, failure to record a correct entry
can have a big effect to organisation. For instance, if a “Store Keeper” wants to order
new computers for organisation “A” and instead of writing 50, unconsciously she
writes 500. This can cause a loss of large amount of money to her organisation.
Moreover, data error is a hot topic in data mining. Failure of cleansing data in data
mining can result to instability of predicted models (Maletic & Marcus 2000). All
these scenarios emphasises the danger human element can violate integrity.
2.3.3 Availabilit y
Availability goes the other way around of confidentiality. Confidentiality focuses on
limiting data availability while on the other hand, availability strives to make data
available (C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.12). Therefore, building on that view
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there must be a balance between these two. However, availability stretches to both the
system itself and the data in it. On system side, availability means the system is fully
operational while on the data side, availability means more than just available for use
(C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.12). It goes beyond to consider the response
time and fairness between requesters. The former consider the time taken from the
time the request was made to the time the data was retrieved. The latter considers the
biasness of resource allocation between requesters.

However, many researchers have defined availability differently. Bishop (2003, p.6)
defines availability as the ability to request and use the systems and resources as
desired. Moreover, Janczewski and Colarik (2005, p.2) defines availability as the
protection of intruders from withholding of information and resources. Regardless to
the meaning of definitions, they all emphasise on convenient environment with no or
minimal system downtime.
2.3.4 Confidentialit y, Integrit y, Availabilit y
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are core elements of computer security and
yet human element is the centre of all these. Employees are expected to keep their
password confidential and yet they may be required to share with colleagues. On the
other hand network administrators are required to carefully analyse network traffic and
yet they ignore it. Moreover, clerks are expected to correctly record data entries, but
yet they either forget or intentionally record them incorrectly. All these intentionally
and unintentionally decisions that humans makes have huge impact to organisation
prosperity.

2.4 Computer systems threats
As previously mentioned, technology is the engineer of all these threats. It is
egocentric to deny the benefit technology has brought us. Unfortunately it is this
technology that made computer attacks evolved from physical to remote attacks. Now
we hear many new terms describing different types of attacks that are out there.
Terminologies like crimeware, malware, driven-by-downloads attacks, man-in-themiddle and many alike have filled the air of digital world. All these terminologies
reflect the increase in vulnerabilities and computer threats as well.
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Figure 2: Trend of internet vulnerabilities
(Adapted from (Stallings 2006, p.10))

As it can be shown on figure 2, in 1995 where internet technology was in its
embryonic stage, the numbers of vulnerabilities were minimal. However, as years are
piling and demands for more functionalities increases, things are getting even worst.
As it can be shown from figure 2, number of vulnerabilities increases with the increase
of years.

However, prior to explanation of computer threats it is worthwhile explaining the
jargons that are associated with it. These include threats and vulnerabilities. Bishop
(2003, p.6) defines threat as a possibility for vulnerability exploitation. This implies
that not necessarily for a threat to occur to be called a threat. On the other side,
vulnerability can be defined as the existence of security loophole that if exploited can
lead to security breach (Peltier 2005). For instance, the discovery of a bug in a browser
which is regarded as vulnerability, in itself is qualified to be a threat even though it has
not been exploited already.
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2.4.1 Motivation of Computer Attackers
It is trivial knowing the number of computer break-ins without knowing the motivation
behind them. Therefore it is worthwhile understanding why computer attackers and
cyber-criminals do what they do. What things that motivates them to be as they are.
George (2007) proposed three factors that motivate these miscreants to be what they
are. Everything we are doing, we do for reasons.

In his descriptions, George (2007) explained three reasons; acts of damage,
propaganda and recruitment and internal communication platform as most reasons to
why attackers practices evil things. In acts of damage he explained political and
financial influences. In propaganda he explained about the art of being recognised and
lastly the disgruntled employees. For instance, due to employment termination
employee can leave a backdoor or logic bomb that can cause disaster to the
organisation (McClure, Scambray & Kurtz 2005, p.14).

In other words, organisations are at high risks. It is this human that organisation trust
and give them keys in terms of passwords to ensure confidentiality of organisation’s
intellectual property. It is this human that organisation trust and give them authority to
control data entry points to ensure the integrity of organisation’s information. It this
human element that organisation trust and give them privilege to monitor network
traffic to prevent organisational network from system downtime. Unfortunately, it is
this human element that organisation can never operate without them. Therefore, it is
necessary for organisations to come up with strategies that will prevent these
“humans” from being conned with ice-like motivations to give-up their trust.
2.4.2 Categories of threats
Furthering on the discussion of computer threats, Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.14)
argues that computer threats comes into three categories; natural and physical,
unintentional and intentional. Natural and physical threats include fire, flood, power
failures and any disaster mainly for computer hardware and premises. On the other
hand, unintentional threats consider awareness of perpetrator (Russell & Gangemi
1991, p.14). If user forgets to shut down the computer system when leaving the office
or failed to apply software patches due to lack of knowledge is termed as awareness
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issue. Lastly is the intentional category which is mainly the focus of this section
because it combines all elements of the latter categories.

Intentional threats include those threats where the perpetrator is being driven by
motivations. These motivations can either be monetary, revenge or popularity (Gorge
2007). Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.14) went further and subcategorises intentional
threat into two categories; inside and outside threats. Inside threats generalise all
threats that are perpetrated from inside the organisation while outside threats are those
that originated from outside the organisation. The whole of this section will focus into
discussing these two subcategories. The discussion will begin with outside threats and
finalise with inside threats. Though there are exists massive types of these threats, but
for the purpose of this dissertation only few relating examples will be considered.
2.4.2.1 Outside threats
Financial gain, revenge and/or the sense of being famous are among motivations that
drive malicious events (Gorge 2007). Outside threats “outsiders” generalise all threats
that are perpetrated from outside the organisation. There are thousands of these attacks
from the former virus techniques where they were dependent on physical distribution,
to the virus of today where they can automatically be perpetrated. However, all these
attacks will be explained in three categories; technical, non-technical and hybrid.


Technical threats

Technology is evolving at a hitherto unimaginable speed. It has evolved from the ages
of mainframe, where applications were limited to specific operations, to the era of
personal computers where there are thousands of applications with different
functionalities. However, as functionalities increases, complexity also increases so as
the number of bugs (McGraw 2004). It is these bugs that are nest ground for attackers.
Meanwhile, technical threats are those threats that perpetrated due to software security
ramifications (McGraw 2004). Through software bugs “vulnerabilities”, attackers can
exploit and initiate their attacks. These threats include viruses, worms, Trojan horse,
denial of service attacks and many alike.

Though one may argue there is no need for employees to be aware on these attacks
since they are self originated from software, employees’ awareness is still crucial to
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minimise their successfulness (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003). Software developers need to
discuss about how to go about developing secure software, while on the other hand
end-users need to be reminded to run software patches.


Non-technical threats

Picking a phone and calling a helpdesk to pose as a system administrator who is away
from the office and desperately ask for a login password pretending to issue a very
crucial transaction, does not include any element of technicality. While technical
threats take advantages of software bugs, non-technical threats take advantage of
human behaviours and their trust (Contos 2007). Non-technical threats are those
threats that are perpetrated by human.

However, this should not be confused with inside threats. In inside threats, malicious
corrupted employees initiate attacks while non-technical attacks employees pose as
vulnerability. These attacks are mainly characterised by social engineering techniques
where bad guys studies employees’ weaknesses and use those weaknesses to rule them
to give out their passwords or any valuable information that eventually may cause a
catastrophic damage to organisation (Fyffe 2008).

As it was explained, all these attacks are directly related to employees within
organisations. If employees are well informed about all their importance in ensuring
organisational computer security, and all possible ways of being conned to leak
organisational intellectual properties, these attacks will at least be minimised. It is
therefore necessary for organisations to appreciate employees’ contribution in
computer security and to frequently keep them informed on current computer threats.


Hybrid threats

As technology evolves, security tools and applications are becoming strong in
protecting against computer threats. On the other side, attackers keep on changing their
tactics to win the battle. As a result, human are left alone without proper knowledge on
how to defend themselves against these attacks. Having spotted this loophole, attackers
have now changed their tactics to integrate weaknesses from both ends. In other words,
hybrid threats are those threats that combine both software errors and human
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weaknesses to launch their attacks. These threats include scam emails, spams, phishing
and many alike.

All these threats have huge negative impacts to the prosperity of organisation. As
George (2007) ascertained, attackers do what they do because of motivations. These
motivations can either be destructive, propaganda or revengeful. However, whichever
the motivation of an attacker is, organisation suffers in one way or the other. Through
these threats organisation can loose large amount of money, its reputation can be
ruined through customers’ distrustful toward its operations. Moreover, organisation’s
performance and its business opportunities are at stake. If a Trojan horse is planted into
organisation’s server where all sensitive information is stored, by transmitting this
information to rivalries, the organisation would not be able to perform to its fullest.
2.4.2.2 Inside threats
Financial gain, revenge and/or the sense of being famous are among motivations that
drive malicious events (Gorge 2007). This raises the question then, who is the
attacker? By its simplicity, attacker is anybody who is attracted by the said motivations
to conduct malicious events. Therefore, it is clear from these motivations that anybody
can be a savage. Building on these explanations, it is therefore crucial to luminance
employees in organisations. Following these motivations, trusted employees may
betray their trust and practice malicious events. In fact, an insider threat is the hot topic
in the security arena. Many researchers have researched about this topic (Schultz 2002;
Kemp 2005; Contos 2007). While disgruntled and malicious corrupted employees fall
under inside threats category (Bishop 2005),

Contos (2007) defines insiders as those employees who have administrative privileges
and can use any system to intentionally violate security policies. Moreover, Schultz
and Shumway (2002, p.189) defines inside threats as intentional misuse of computer
systems by users who are authorized to access those systems and networks. Though it
is not clearly stated from all these definitions, inside attackers extends to include exemployees and third parties; consultants, contractors and temporary helpers (Schultz
2002; Kemp 2005; Contos 2007). Unlike outside attackers, insiders pose a big
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challenge because they can legitimately pass electronic and physical security controls
(Contos 2007).

The joint survey “Insider Threat Study” conducted in 2002 by United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), United States Secret Service (USSS)
National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) reveals that 86% of insiders held
technical positions. In those cases, 81% of the organisations that were attacked
experienced a negative financial impact as a result of insider activities. The losses
ranged from a low of five hundred dollars to a high of “tens of millions of dollars.”
75% of organisations experienced some impact on their business operations. 28% of
organisations experienced negative impact to their reputations. The survey included
forty-nine inside threats cases which were experienced between 1999 and 2002 (USCERT 2008).

Authentication is one method of ensuring information confidentiality. Unfortunately,
password mechanism is the common approach to it. The survey conducted by Stanton
and colleagues (2005) on users’ behaviour pertaining password management revealed
that 27.9% of 1167 respondents write down their passwords to help them remember.
However, this is motivated by the number of different passwords user needs to interact
with a number of different systems in their daily operations. As usual, technology is
there to serve human being. The emergent of automated tools such as cookies that keep
track of users’ password was embraced by users. Unfortunately these tools made
things even easier for attackers to obtain users passwords (Stanton et al. 2005).

Though many solutions are proposed to deal with inside attackers, employees’
awareness in security issues is still crucial (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.13). However,
it should also be noted that awareness of security policies and computer threats alone is
not enough to tackle this problem. Security awareness programme(s) should go further
to address the issues by making employees understand their contributions in the
organisations and their benefits out of it. Furthermore, management should consider
employees’ incentives when practicing good security principles.

All these threats have large negative impacts to the prosperity of organisations. As
George (2007) ascertained, attackers do what they do because of motivations. These
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motivations can either be destructive, propaganda or revengeful. However, whichever
the motivation of an attacker is, organisation suffers in one way or the other. Through
these threats organisation can loose large amount of money, its reputation can be
ruined by customers’ distrustful toward its operations. Moreover, organisation’s
performance and its business opportunities are at stake. If a Trojan horse is planted into
organisation’s server where all sensitive information is stored, by transmitting this
information to rivalries, the organisation would not be able to perform to its fullest.

2.5 Computer systems security controls
Attackers are good on what they do because of the incentives they are up to (Gorge
2007). Following these incentives, anyone can be motivated and act maliciously.
Those guys from outside are working twenty-four-seven to fulfil their motives while,
on the other hand, employees are betraying their trust and act maliciously. The danger
is huge out there. Organisations are not safe from both inside and outside miscreants. It
is now time for organisations to understand what they worth and initiate necessary
control measures against these attacks.

Computer systems security has long evolve into a number of phases (Dhillon 1999;
von Solms 2000; D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). As technology evolves, attackers also
change their tactics, so as the control measures. From the age of mainframe where
control measures intended to protect computer premises and resources usage, to the
client-server era where single access controls were appropriate control measures, up to
web services arena where there is a need of international standards and highly
expertise in computer security. Many researchers contributed in describing this
evolution (Dhillon 1999; von Solms 2000; D'Arcy & Hovav 2007).

Dhillon (1999) describes computer security based on three intervention; technical,
formal and informal. He explained the reliance of technology like message
authentication, encryption and digital signature (technical interventions), and
emphasised on organisation restructuring to accommodate computer security (formal
interventions). In informal interventions he emphasised on the importance of educating
users in computer security issues.
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von Solms (2000) describes computer systems security into series of waves. In the first
wave he described computer security based on technical controls like user passwords
and ids. In the second wave he focused on management involvement in computer
security where he mentioned the establishment of security policies and procedures. In
the final phase he focused on the need of international security standards and security
certification, organisational security culture and keeping an eye on control measures.

Moreover, D'Arcy and Hovav (2007) describe computer security with four
countermeasures;

security

policies,

security

awareness

programs,

computer

monitoring, and preventive security software. The first and second countermeasures
emphasises on enforcing security good conducts by defining security requirements in
terms of users’ responsibilities and procedures, and inform their duties and
consequences of their ignorance. Computer monitoring provides a close watch of
users’ behaviours whereas the last countermeasure focuses on protecting against
unauthorised access.

All the above analysis of computer security share common perceptions. Almost all
descriptions explicitly, if not implicitly, explain technical, management and
institutional security control measures. Therefore, in order to be consistent, this section
will adopt the approach described by von Solms (2000) to describe different computer
security control measures. This approach was chosen because it reflects the reality of
implementing security control measures based on organisations’ needs. The summary
of what constitute in each phase is provided in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Summary of security control waves

To begin with the discussion, this section starts by the discussion of first wave where it
includes the discussion of all physical and technical security control measures. The
discussion of the second wave will follow where all managerial participation in
computer security will be discussed. Finally, the discussion of the third wave where it
will describe international security concerns and the focus of human factor in security
controls. In this section each phase will be used as an umbrella to accommodate all
security control measures that fall under that category.
2.5.1 The First Wave - Technical
Computer threats are evolving with technology evolution. The more technology
introduce us new magic, the more attackers are closing the gap toward us. Technology
in its embryonic stage, computer attacks required physical mechanisms like floppy
disks for virus distribution or physical tapping of cooperate network. However, things
are different now. With an openness of internet, attackers are able to launch there
attacks almost anywhere in the world. Only your IP address is enough to track where
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you are. Although there are voluminous of control measures to deal with these attacks,
this section will only explain some of them.

Technology in its dawn, computer security was not a headache. This was the time
when physical guiding of computer rooms was enough to ensure safety of computer
system and its resources. In this era, security related roles concentrated on physical
controls and suitable motivations for computer operators (Janczewski & Colarik 2005,
pp.6-7). Their main concerns were limited to power fluctuations and natural disasters
like fire and flood. This was the time when identification cards, fire alarms, sprinkler
systems, temperature gauges and surge protectors were enough for computer security
(Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.14).

Furthermore, to control computer system from unauthorised access, operating systems’
facilities like account access controls, user ids and passwords were enough to
guarantee the security of organisation’s information resources (von Solms 2000).
However, this unauthorised access meant protecting the system from computer
resources abuse (Andress 2003, p.1). This was the time when computer memory and
speed were scarce resources.

As computer memory and speed increased, and after organisations’ realisation of the
power of information, computer controls shifted to enhance confidentiality and
integrity of information (von Solms 2000). In their initial forms, these controls focused
on prevention of information disclosure by limiting illegal copies of information stored
on magnetic media or hard documents (Janczewski & Colarik 2005, pp.6-7). Things
changed when information sharing arouse. More technologies such as granular access
control, single sign-on and encryption were developed to prevent unauthorized access
and modification (Andress 2003, p.1).

However, with all these control measures the number of computer break-ins kept on
increasing. The complexity of software applications kept on increasing, so as the
number of bugs. Moreover, software engineering paradigm did not consider the issue
of security as their concerns. On the other hand, users who operate computer systems
and the so called security tools and applications were left unaware of the current
computer threats and how they attack.
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2.5.2 The Second Wave – Management
As it was mentioned previously, computer security is a three magnitude process. It
involves technology, people and process (Andress 2003, p.5). Failure of one
component leads to the failure of the whole process and hence leaves the organisation
and its sensitive information in a jangle. The first wave of computer control measures,
organisations strive to acquire the most sophisticated technologies to patch security
holes. Security controls ranged from physical controls where the focus was on
protecting computer premises, to the installation of necessary technologies to combat
with computer attacks.

However, as technology kept on advancing, information became an organisational
asset hence management involvement in computer security became apparent (von
Solms 2000). This was the time when organisational security exceeded its boundaries
by maintaining organisation’s reputation by considering costumers’ trust and
satisfaction (Herold 2005, pp.7-14). Technical personnel realised the pressure of
maintaining corporate security and they demanded for power to control corporate
security. This was when security policies were introduced in organisations to enforce
employees’ accountability for security related activities (Herold 2005, p.15).

The first initiative to establish security policies was by US Department of Defence
(DoD) in 1970s where they sponsored a research which focused on developing security
policy models (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.30). The first form of security policies was
simple only concentrating on guiding employees from drinking or smoking in
computer room (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.14). However, as technology evolves new
policies are emerged to cope with current security issues. Security policies for guiding
employees from smoking or drinking do not work with today’s technological
advancement. Internet, World Wide Web and the so called E-commerce demands more
sophisticated policies on ensuring online trust and internet usage within organisations.

However, all these security policies are not enough to ensure maximum computer
security within the organisation. The worst part of is the nature of policy
establishment. Policies are established based on computer threats. Therefore with this
growing nature of technology, it is apparent that there will be thousands of policies to
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be followed. Moreover, it is nearly impossible for these policies to luminance every
aspect of human concerning with computer security. Technology is unpredictable
parameter therefore organisations should focus more on building their manpower to
exercise computer security ethics. Management should show their concerns with
computer security, and the potentiality of its subordinates in ensuring corporate
computer security.
2.5.3 The Third Wave - In stitutionalisation
As technology advances the world becomes a single village. The issue of computer
security become a global problem. Physical and technical controls and ordinary
organisational security policies become out weighted when it comes to digital world.
This is the era that characterised by computer security standardisation, international
computer security certifications, security culture and dynamic measure of computer
security control measures (von Solms 2000). In this wave, computer security control
measures shifted from organisational interests to governmental and international
interests. The interest is not how the organisation benefits from computer security, but
what organisations do to ensure customers’ privacy and state security.

In this wave the focus is the state level of information and computer security
management and combination of experiences of several big organisations in computer
security management to form a consensus on common international information and
computer security standards (von Solms 2000). This can be exemplified by European
Data Protection Directive that focuses on privacy protection of citizens by insisting
training to employees about privacy issues. However, this is directive focus only
within European Union. On the other hand, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act focuses on
controlling financial activities.

In this wave, management shifted their gears to consider training and education to its
employees. The locus shifted from just maintaining corporate information to the
compliance of the growing number of laws and regulations that enforce information
protection and customers’ privacy (Herold 2005, p.5). Moreover, the international
image of computer security is reflected with the existence of pool of security
qualification certificates. Following ISO standards which also emphasises on
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employees’ training, there are security qualification certificates that focuses on
equipping information security personnel with appropriate skills to initiate and execute
training programme in organisations.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at investigating current situations on computer threats as associated
with users and the efforts organisations undertake to control them. In computer
systems background, a discussion of computer evolution in relation to computer
security was conducted. In this chapter, it is pointed out that the advancement nature of
technology has a large impact on computer security by both introducing more bugs
into applications and attracting more users who are most susceptible to computer
threats. Moreover, it is this technology that facilitates the advancement of computer
attacks by offering more convenient ways for attackers to launch their attacks.

Moreover, in this chapter human element has been identified as a central to
successfulness of computer security and organisation’s prosperity as well. It is human
element that is responsible to maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability of
organisation’s information resources. This view directly correlates with the increase
number of inside threats. Employees are either unintentionally or intentionally ignore
organisation’s security requirements and hence encourages more security break-ins
which results to loss of reputation, competitive advantages and money to the
organisation.

Many computer security control measures have been implemented, from technical
through managerial to institutional, to combat with computer threats. Unfortunately,
with all these efforts the number of computer threats keeps on increasing. Although
among these control measures security user awareness has been identified as the key to
successful computer security, it either receives little emphasise from management or
lacks appropriate approaches to attract users’ participation. Therefore, the next chapter
provides the discussion of security awareness with emphasise on investigating users’
involvement in security awareness and the effectiveness of current security awareness
programmes in educating users.
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3

SECURITY AWARENESS

3.1 Introduction
As it was explained previously, many security mechanisms exist to fight against the
current computer threats. Although there is recognition that the human factor plays an
important part of security mechanisms, the role of user awareness receives limited
attention. Security user awareness programmes focus at informing users on their roles
and responsibilities and imparting them with appropriate knowledge to fulfil them.
However this should not be confused to end-users alone. Managers’ and IS specialists’
involvement should also be taken into considerations. Currently, there are many types
of security awareness programmes but they overlook the importance of users’
involvement in security awareness material preparation.

Although security awareness is just one component of security learning circle, for the
purpose of this dissertation it will be discussed in detail with other components being
presented in less detail. The main aim of this dissertation is to develop a framework to
harness the power of KMS to improve security awareness. However, it is worth to
have a clear understanding of security awareness in an organisational context and
identify key issues that have been notified in literature as crucial for successful
implementation of security awareness programme(s).

Due to the influence of security awareness in information systems’ security, much has
been written emphasising its different aspects. However, in this dissertation, the focus
will be only be on exploring different perceptions of security awareness programme,
designing process, current awareness programmes, their success and failure and
security awareness in developed and developing countries. Though developed and
developing countries includes many countries, this chapter will only consider Ireland
and Tanzania as developed and developing countries respectively. This chapter
concludes by outlining the crucial bits for the success of security awareness
programme(s).
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3.2 What is security awareness?
In chapter 2, many security threats and their possible solutions have been discussed.
The majority, if not all, of these threats are either caused or driven by human element
from both top managers and operational employees. Software flaws, caused by
developing team, are very common in this era of project deadlines. They are very
common gateways for security threats. On the other hand, social engineering
dominates in ruling employees into opening gates for attackers. It is therefore very
crucial for organisations to take into account users’ education in security relevant
issues.

As it was explained previously, security is a three magnitude process. It involves
technology, people and process. This implies failure to one component results to the
failure of the whole process (Andress 2003, p.5). There is no doubt on the maturity of
technological security controls. The existence of anti-virus, anti-spam, firewalls,
network sniffers and many alike all, shows the extent to which technology has
dominated computer security. However, user’ education on security relevant issues
receives a minimum attention. As a result many security awareness programmes fails.
This section explores what exactly a security awareness programme is, the roles that
must be involved and its differences from training and education.
3.2.1 Securit y awareness - Defined
Prior to delving into discussing security awareness programme, it is worthwhile
explaining the differences between security policies, security awareness and security
awareness programme. Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.30) defines security policy as a
tool for enforcing computer security by declaring rules, standards and regulations on
how computer and information assets should be managed within an organisation. On
the other hand, Desman (2002, pp.3-10) defines security awareness as employees’
understanding on security control measures and their consequences. The former
defines security requirements while the latter determines users’ understanding.
Furthermore, NIST-SP 800 – 50 (2003) defines security awareness programme as the
vehicle for disseminating information that users need in order to do their jobs. It is then
clear from the definition that the latter communicates security requirements.
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However, there is still a conflict on what exactly is security awareness programme. As
NIST-SP 800 – 50 (2003) defines, security awareness programme as a vehicle for
disseminating information that users, including managers, need in order to do their
jobs. On the other side, Nosworthy (2000) defines security awareness programme as a
tool to impart users with appropriate knowledge to perform their duties. The former
definition emphasises on informing users about what they should do to ensure security
of corporate information assets and the consequences of their security related
decisions. Contrary, the latter definition emphasises on imparting users with
appropriate knowledge to perform security related responsibilities.

The former definition lacks the reflection that it should also be a tool to impart users
with appropriate knowledge to perform their duties (Nosworthy 2000). How can a user
know how to deal with new phishing techniques without being imparted with
appropriate knowledge? The awareness of roles and responsibilities must go hand-inhand with appropriate knowledge so as to enable users to participate in improving
organisational security. The latter definition can also be backed-up by the work of
D’Arcy and Hovav (2007) where they defines security awareness programme as the
improvement of users’ understanding on their responsibilities on ensuring security of
organisational knowledge and information resources, and the consequence of ignoring
or abusing these resources by imparting them with appropriate skills to fulfil their
responsibilities.

Therefore, throughout this dissertation, security awareness programme will be
regarded as a twofold role. The first role “awareness” as a means of disseminating
information about users’ responsibilities, working standards and procedures (Desman
2002, pp.3-10) and the second role “simple training” as disseminating security
relevant material explaining current issues of computer threats so as to combat users
with appropriate knowledge to fight against these threats (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007).
However, it is worthwhile explaining what, who and how parts of security awareness
programme. The “what” part explains what should be disseminating, “who” explains
the target audience and “how” explains the procedures for accomplishing the “what”.

Consider this scenario. Security personnel of organisation “A” drew a policy to
strengthen employees’ passwords. The policy only states the minimum requirement for
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password length as 14 characters long. What do you think will happen to employees?
Will they ignore the policy for the fear that the password will be too long? The answer
is obvious no. Users tend to go for a cheaper solution, they will comply with the policy
by creating a 14 long password but only with letters, which is easy to be hacked.
Therefore, without imparting users with appropriate knowledge on how to create
strong passwords they can still adhere with the policy but in their simplest way which
creates a burden to computer security. This concludes that the “what” and “how” of
security awareness programme should go hand-to-hand.

Who are target audience? This question is the same as whose are security policies for?
As it was defined previously, security policy is a tool for enforcing computer security
by declaring rules, standards and regulations on how computer and information assets
should be managed within an organisation (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.30). This
implies that the issue of computer security is an organisational issue, therefore there is
no exceptional. Since security awareness programme is a tool for selling security
policies and relevant security issues organisational wide therefore all levels of
organisational management must be included (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003).
3.2.2 Relationship between securit y awareness, training and education
Security awareness is just one component of organisational security learning process
(NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003; Microsoft 2006). The cycle, as described in later sections,
consists of three components; awareness, training and education. However, there is
confusion on what constitutes awareness, training and education. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to bring their differences in this section so as to have a clear picture of
their meaning and purpose.

As it was previously defined, security awareness is the understanding of security
controls and their effects on organisational IS security (Desman 2002, pp.3-10).
Moreover, D’Arcy and Hovac (2007) and Microsoft (2006) explain the purpose of
security awareness as to change users’ behaviour by combating them with appropriate
security knowledge. On the other hand, training as Microsoft (2006) and NIST-SP 50
(2006) explains, its main purpose is to impart users with new computer security skills.
However, it should be noted that the training that is being considered here is absolutely

33

different with the “simple training” as mentioned previously. This one is more formal
while the former is highly volatile, changes with the daily needs of security
requirements.

In short, awareness focus on changing employees’ behaviour on specific security
issues while training focuses on giving new skills to perform a specific function
(NIST-SP 800 - 50, 2003). Awareness targets everyone in the organisation while
training only focuses on group of people especially technical staff. Education, on the
other hand, focuses on creating new knowledge and skills about computer security in a
broader view by considering other fields like psychology, philosophy and many others
(Buckley & Caple 2007, p.6). This level is mainly for security experts who wish to
expand their security knowledge and relate with other disciplines. More distinctions of
these three components can be obtained in table 2.

Attribute
Level
Learning
objectives
Example
Teaching Media

Test Measure

Impact timeframe

AWARENESS
“What”
Information
Recognition
and
retention
Media
(Video,
Newsletters,
Posters)

True/False
Multiple choice
(identifying
learning)
Short-term

TRAINING
“How”
Knowledge
Skill

EDUCATION
“Why”
Insight
Understanding

Practical
Instruction
(Lecture
and/or
demo, Case study,
Hands-on practice)

Theoretical
Instructions
(Seminar
and
discussion, Reading
and
Study,
Research)
Problem
solving Essay
i.e. recognition and (interpret learning)
resolution (apply
learning)
Intermediate
Long-term

Table 2: Awareness, Training and Education - Comparative Framework
(Source: NIST-SP 800-16 1998)

3.3 Security awareness building process
As was mentioned previously, security awareness programme is the focal point for
practicing good security principles. If it is well executed, security awareness alone is
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enough to recover organisation from the hands of attackers (NIST-SP 800 - 50 2003).
It plays a very difficult role of transforming human behaviours into embracing security
principles. Therefore, understanding its building blocks is a one step for the
development of an effective framework to support security awareness which is an aim
of the project in this dissertation.

Much has been written about the development of security awareness. However only
the approach proposed by Desman (2002) will be considered in this dissertation. This
approach was preferred because it is a generic approach; there is no an element of
biasness due to organisation or country. Desman (2002) describes the process of
building information security awareness programme(s) as being divided into four
phases: getting started, establishing baseline, communication and evaluation. In this
dissertation, the approach is termed as generic approach. However, it should also be
noted that this name is only for the purpose of this dissertation and not otherwise.
3.3.1 Getting started
Desman (2002), argues that understanding organisational culture is the key to the
successful of security awareness programme(s). He commented that by doing so it will
help in understanding management team, the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation
and the current workable communication channels in the organisation. Moreover, he
also suggested that one must ferret for available resources that are useful for a
successful accomplishment of the programme. These resources includes any control
measure documentation and any communication channels that are available.
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Figure 4: The process for building security awareness programme

3.3.2 Establishing a Baseline
“Building on giant’s shoulders.” is a common axiom that we use. After rummaging for
existing resources to use, understanding organisation’s key personnel and
understanding its culture, now it is time to sit down and decide what is to be excluded
or included in awareness programme and with what extent of amendments. Many of
obtained control measures might be outdated. Therefore, one need to evaluate the
necessity of these control measures by reflecting the current situation and decide to
whether replace them or make them endeavours prior to documentation (Desman
2002).

Desman also emphasised on the involvement of users who in one way or the other
participated in the creation of control measures at hand, and also the necessity of
wining users’ commitments. However, his main concerns were focusing on “big guys”
who set control measures. The question is what about those people who have not
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participated in creation but yet they are affected with these control measures? This is in
fact a very crucial point to miss. Users, at all level, should be consulted for their
contribution on what seems for them to be necessary for the assurance of corporate
computer security.
3.3.3 Communication
After all necessary procedures to create security awareness materials and that the
document is already set, what follows then is to get the prepared materials reach all
people in the organisation. Desman suggests a number of methods to fulfil this task
including video taping, PC programs, email and web pages and finally paper-and-ink
approach. In PC programs he explained about moderated screen show with facilitator
presenting the document and its contents, self-paced moderated screen show and on
terminal video show. In the latter method he suggested on screen pop up of the show.
This is when a user login to his/her accounts and receives an option to watch the show
or ignore it.

In fact the approach of making users watch the scene about security concerns
whenever they login is an effective approach because it gives them everyday updates
on security status. Therefore, if there is a new security break-in, this approach is useful
to deliver the information to users in a real time. One major problem which Desman
notifies is the awareness of employees who are in holiday. However, this approach is
even useful when they come back or even when new employees join the organisation.
Though this may sound to be much involving in respect to time required to sit down
and watch the movie, a little adjustment of the contents might turn the coin “face-up”
3.3.4 Evaluation
All the way from rummaging for existing control measures and communications
media, amendments and replacements of security controls up to letting the word out,
letting users to know what has been done, it is a long journey to be left out without
monitoring its progress. Desman encourages monitoring and evaluation of the program
so as to evaluate its progress, or otherwise. The aim of the program is to educate users
on their roles in computer security and the consequences of their ignorance toward
computer security.
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Desman (2002) proposes two approaches for monitoring and evaluating security
awareness programme; number of break-ins and audit reports. Number of break-ins
focus on pre and post evaluation of computer threats. This type of evaluation can take
any form; interview or questionnaire. The common questions are like, did the number
of break-ins increased since the introduction of awareness program? If yes, then what
could be wrong; the materials covered are irrelevant or they have not reached users at
large? Moreover, useful information can be obtained from audit trails. The number of
password failure attempts, attempts to delete system files and may alike. Whatever
findings from the evaluation, could be very useful information to act as an input for the
next security awareness materials

This approach is useful because it considers almost every angle of successful building
of security awareness programme. As it was mentioned in getting started, emphasise
should be put on understanding organisational culture. Culture is a strong element for
major changes, so by taking it into account, it means that security awareness
programme is in the right track for its successful implementation. Moreover, it is also
important to consider people who participated in the development of previous control
measures since they may provide some useful information for the successfully
accomplishment of the programme.

Moreover, a crucial bit of successful security awareness programme is the means of
communication to deliver what has been prepared to users. Security policies and
relevant materials should reach employees within organisation at large. Therefore it is
necessary to opt for communication channel that is acceptable by the people who use
it. Failure to do so may result to ignorance and hence failure of the programme.
Finally, there must be some sort of evaluation of the programme. Despite the cost
spent during programme development, awareness programme aim at reducing the
number of break-ins by equipping employees with appropriate knowledge. Therefore,
it is plausible to evaluate its successfulness or otherwise.

However, the question then arouse, is this security awareness programme that we are
talking about tackling the current state of computer threats where threats evolve at an
alarming speed or for a long-term plan? If it is for daily, more dynamic environment
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then this approach is obsolete, unless stated clear that all these steps are for building
permanent long-term security awareness programme that will be evolving with the
change in environment.

3.4 Current security awareness approaches
The journey to implement a successful security awareness programme is a long
journey. Understanding the “what”, “who” and “how” part of it, is just one step for its
implementation. As it was previously mentioned, much must be covered prior to actual
implementation of security awareness programme. Desman (2002), describes the
implementation process with four phases of which each has several subsection that
explains mosaic of factors to be covered. Since designing a framework for security
awareness is the aim of this dissertation, it is worthwhile to explore how the olds have
played the game so that we can snatch some tips out of them.

This section will explore different approaches of security awareness programme by
examining the applicability of the above defined implementation phases. Though there
are mosaic of security awareness approaches, this section will only focus on five
categories that are mostly deployed in industry; incorporating in employment
agreement, face-to-face, awareness tools, awareness games and web-based. The
section will finalise by identifying common weaknesses as spotted in these approaches.
To begin with, the discussion of incorporating security awareness in employment
agreement will be provided then followed by the discussion of face-to-face approach.
Thereafter the discussion of awareness tools and games will be provided and finalise
with the discussion of web-based approaches.
3.4.1 Securit y awareness in employment agreements
Security awareness programme can take many forms. It can be delivered as a game
based, face-to-face, awareness tools, web-based. Herold (2005, p.40) proposes an
approach of incorporating computer security requirements into job descriptions,
employment agreements and awareness acknowledgements. It is Herold’s idea that by
incorporating security awareness in employees’ recruitment processes it increases the
accessibility of security awareness materials since each employee follows the same
channel of recruitment.
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However, this approach is more static and focuses much on disseminating of security
policies. The world of digital threats is moving fast. If we need to be safe, then we
need a more dynamic and real time security awareness approaches. It is insufficient for
users to just be aware of their responsibilities and the impacts of their decisions. What
is sufficient is to induce security mindset by making computer security as our daily
conversations.
3.4.2 Face-to-face securit y awareness programme
There are many approaches of face-to-face security awareness programmes (Schifreen
2006). These approaches range from personal-based to group-based security awareness
programmes. Personal-based approaches are when a trainer focuses only with an
individual employee, while group based is when the trainer focuses on a number of
users. Schifreen (2006, p.56) and Herold (2006, p.225) argues that in-personal
awareness training is appropriate approach because it reduces interactions between
audiences and hence increases their attention.

However, the applicability of what has been presented during the awareness session
depends on the availability of summary material of what has been discussed
(Nosworthy 2000). They need a good reference material to refer what has been
discussed. If reference material has been prepared such that it can be used on a daily
basis then employees would be encouraged even more to use what they have learned
(Nosworthy 2000). Moreover, the effectiveness of this approach relies on the
instructor. Most organisations take expert from the domain to conduct a presentation.
However, being expert not necessarily good presenter (Herold 2005, p.56).
3.4.3 Securit y awareness tools
As an effort to overcome computer threats based on software vulnerabilities,
Sankarpandian and colleagues (2008) developed a tool that triggers users’ awareness
about un-patched software in their system by painting graffiti image on users’ desktop,
see figure 5. TALC which stands for Threat Awareness, Learning, and Control,
constantly searches for any installed software in users’ machine then compare the
results with predefined list of software with available patches from NIST National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) (Sankarpandian, Little & Edwards 2008).
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Figure 5: Screenshot of TALC Anti-Phishing Tool
(Source: (http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ ))

If it finds a new patch, it verifies if it has already been applied in corresponding
software that is currently installed in user’s machine. If it has not been applied, the tool
draws a graffiti image to notify user about a threat, see figure 5. When user’s cursor
hover over graffiti area, the tool displays the name of that software and the type of
threat it might cause. This is done by consulting NVD at connection time to retrieve
patch information. Threat severity is indicated the size of graffiti image; the larger the
image the higher the severity.

Although TALC was developed to specifically help home users against computer
threats based on software vulnerabilities, but it can also effectively work in
organisation environment where there is no centralised patching system like Marimba
Patch Management (http://www.bmc.com). However, to effectively handle cross-cut
computer threats, the tool need to be upgraded to accommodate other threats like
phishing, social engineering, spam emails, password management any many alike.

41

3.4.4 Securit y awareness games
Participatory approach is among new teaching technique that is being practiced in
academic institutions. It is a very effective method because it draws learner’s attention
throughout the session. Since it’s a teaching approach, there is no exemption for its
applicability into imparting users with appropriate knowledge to deal with different
computer threats. In this approach users participate into identifying attackers’
malicious events by playing game.

After realising the power of games into delivering knowledge, Sheng and colleagues
(2007), designed an anti-phishing game that focuses on imparting users with
knowledge to detect malicious websites, see figure 6. They obtained a list of phishing
URLs and categorised into three categories where training messages were created for
each category. These messages were then embedded in the game as help and feedback
explaining what should be and/or have been done respectively (Sheng et al. 2007).

Figure 6: Screenshot of Anti- Phishing Phil Game
(Source: (http://www.cmu.edu/ ))
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However, the approached is too narrow focusing only on Web sites’ URLs. Suppose,
in real world, user failed to identify the phishing URL, what should other tips user go
for? This approach only equips users with phishing websites identification and ignored
other side of the coin. Moreover, the approach is too rigid; too stiff to include other
computer threats. The approach need to be very flexible to accommodate any computer
threat at hand (Sankarpandian, Little & Edwards 2008).
3.4.5 Web-based approaches
Face-to-face security awareness approach is inappropriate when the organisation is of
mega size. To conduct security awareness programme in an environment like this it
involves both time and money. Therefore, in the environment like this a web-based
approach can be deployed. The common methodologies in web-based approach are
security awareness via e-mail and organisational websites. E-mail approach is when
security personnel posts security related updates to employees through organisational
or personal email accounts. On the other hand, website is also being used to post
security related issues.

However, both these approaches have limitations; they only provide a one way
communications. Though web technology offers much functionality that can
effectively facilitate security awareness, majority of current web-based awareness
programmes ignores these functionalities.

Incorporation of security awareness in employment agreements, face-to-face, security
awareness tools and games, and web-based approaches, all these have limitations on
effectively communicating security related issues to employees. Their rigidity nature
and poor accessibility of employees both reflects their ignorance of security awareness
building process. Having security awareness programme in place without a proper
employees’ change management could lead to ignorance of the programme and hence
failure of security awareness programme. Therefore, to be successful, we need to
involve employees from initial stages of building process so as to build collaborative
nature between security personnel and end-users.
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3.5 Security awareness in Ireland
“Minister launches internet security awareness campaign” the opening headline of the
Ireland’s national news independent website, http://www.independent.ie, on February
11, 2008. It is not the intent of this section to relay news about security awareness, but
the headline reflects the efforts of which the government of Ireland has taken into
fighting against computer threats. Although there is no scholarly literature that have
specifically discussed about security awareness in Ireland, but with this piece of
information, it is clearly that the issue of computer security has flooded from
organisations to the public concerns.

Although the aim of this dissertation is to develop a framework to leverage KMS to
improve security awareness, it is crucial to understand how different countries perceive
on security awareness. The intent is to develop an open framework that can be applied
elsewhere in the world; therefore it is worthwhile investigating how different countries
perceive the issues of security awareness. Ireland was chosen because it was within the
reach of the author and it also represents developed countries.

Irish government has initiated many campaigns to increase public awareness on
computer security matters. These campaigns involve different categories of audiences
including children who are tomorrow’s generation. However, due to lack of source of
information, this section will only concentrate on web-based security awareness
approaches specifically to websites and blogs.
3.5.1 National campaign on securit y awareness
Understanding the benefits of computer systems and its applications, and the danger
that exists on internet services, the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural
resources launched an official website as a central for National Awareness campaign
on Computer security (http://www.ncte.ie). http://www.ncte.ie is an open website
which aims at providing free tips on computer security to different users. Among the
users are business, citizens, legal and kids.

This is powerful strategy to motivate both individual and organisations to leverage
computer security issues in their daily operations. However, the campaign overlooked
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the involvement of computer and security experts. It overlooked the fact that even
security experts need to be considered in the periodic education on security matters.
The website focuses mainly with end-users from different sectors.
3.5.2 National Centre for Technology in Education
The National Centre for Technology in Education (NCTE) is an Irish Government
agency established to provide advice, support and information on the use of
information and communications technology (ICT) in education. Following the same
strategy of raising security awareness within Irish community, NCTE had gone further
by providing security awareness to its audience under an open website webwise
(http://www.webwise.ie). This website provides security awareness on different topics
in computer security.

The website provides awareness into three categories of audiences; children, teens and
adults. One of the strongest features of http://www.webwise.ie is the ability to deliver
the message based on the category of audiences. For instance, for kids it uses cartoons
to elaborate security relevant issues. Moreover, to delivery teens’ security matters,
http://www.webwise.ie connects to another open website watchyourspace.ie where
teens can obtain security issues based on the scenario that suits them
(http://www.watchyourspace.ie). http://www.webwise.ie also provides video clips and
“how to” link which elaborates security issues.
3.5.3 Internet Advisory Board
The Internet Advisory Board (IAB) is an Irish body which is responsible on assisting
and supporting the Irish Internet Service Provider (ISPAI) industry to deliver an
effective self-regulatory environment for internet content (http://www.iab.ie/). Apart
from its core duties, IAB also promote awareness of internet safety, particularly with
regard to children.

It provides guiding information to parents on different techno-social aspects
concerning their kids. Although, in one side, it is a weakness to only concentrate to
parents and ignores other categories of users, but in the long run its results could be
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tremendously. This is because good ethics that are being taught to kids grows with
them and these kids, in some days, may turn to be good computer security generation.

Ireland is far ahead in security awareness campaign. Government has initiated many
security awareness initiatives which if they will be maintained and periodically
improved, Ireland will be the leading territory in Europe in computer security ethics.
Irish government has shown a good example that can be adopted with other countries.
Its strategy to educate children in a secure way of using internet and computer systems
in general, it is a strongest strategy that prepares the next generation to be security
savvy. It makes children to grow with security mindsets and eventually computer
security will be adopted in society.

3.6 Security awareness in Tanzania
“Currently very few educational institutions have computer laboratories…” and
“Tanzania needs to create and sustain a secure cyber-law environment...” are the two
statements that are enough to reflect the perception of security awareness in Tanzania
(http://www.tanzania.go.tz). Tanzania, like majority of African countries, it is very far
behind technology, so as computer security. Tanzania was chosen in this dissertation
because it was within the reach of the author and it also represents developing
countries.

The evidence shows developing countries are far behind computer security (Cole et al.
2008). There is no a central body for establishing legal actions on both computer abuse
and Cybercrime. Currently organisations rely on their security policies as the means of
protecting their information resources (Bugada 2005). On the other hand individuals
with internet access at their homeplace relies on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
provide them with some sort of security, only with the exceptional of few home users
with antivirus applications.

Therefore much effort is required in organisations that are in developing countries.
Executives need to be educated on the danger of corporate information assets so as
they can be willing to fund security control measures and also motivate its employees’
participation in security issues. However, though this can be seen as a big challenge in
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computer security context, still it can be advantageous to researchers to develop a
model that can be used by developing countries when deploying new technology.

3.7 Failure of current security awareness-findings
Based on the conducted intensive literature review on both computer security and
security awareness, it is clear that the successfulness of security awareness
programmes goes with four essential parameters; programme material, mode of
delivery, security culture and organisation culture. Failure to comply with these
parameters leads to failure in successful execution of security awareness programme.

The former parameter concentrates on the content that needs to be delivered to the
targeted users, while mode of delivery focuses on the means of disseminating security
awareness material. Security culture focuses on motivations and initiatives toward
computer security, while organisational culture focuses on the “don’ts” and “do’s” of
the organisation. Though there are many scenarios to elaborate these parameters, this
section will only concentrates on major ones.
3.7.1 Material delivered to audiences
It is boring when attending a chemical engineering presentation of a professor who
frequently uses chemical terminologies while you are not from that domain. However,
it is enjoyable listening to Knowledge Management module because you are familiar
with the terminologies. Unfortunately, the same case happens in security awareness
programmes. Many organisations overlook the need assessment of security awareness
materials and instead they buy on shelves material and without even customising to
meet the nature of organisation’s problem (Herold 2005, p.56). This not only makes
security awareness session boring but also ruined organisational computer security.
3.7.2 Mode of material delivery
Mode of delivery is another crucial parameter. This concentrates on how security
policies and security relevant materials are being conveyed to employees. Security
relevant material should be channelled through the media that is accepted by both ends
of organisational chart; from top management to operational personnel (Desman 2002,
pp.19-26). However, this is an organisational culture issue; what are the doable and
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undoable. Mode of security policy and awareness material delivery must be effective
enough to both gain high accessibility to organisation as a whole and to be in real time.
3.7.3 Organisational securit y culture
Current security initiatives and users’ motivations have impact to the successful
embracement of security awareness programme within an organisation (Chia, Maynard
& Ruighaver 2002; Herold 2005, p.35). Many researchers have talked about
organisational security culture but to author’s knowledge none have tried to define
what it is (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002). Therefore, for the purpose of this
dissertation, organisational security culture can be defined as an organisational
subculture that focuses specifically with security relevance initiatives and motivations.
This is mainly under the Computer Systems and Information Security department.
However, this must correlates with the nature organisational culture.

There is no direct tangible benefit of security to users (Bishop 2005, p.16). If there is
nothing in return, security will turn to be an option to users. However, though there
might be security policies to bind users to do and not to things, users tend to ignore
these policies. For instance, though many organisations have “do not share your
password” policies, survey revealed 23% of 1167 respondents share their passwords
with their colleagues within and outside their working places (Stanton et al. 2005).
These passwords may result to financial and/or information theft, loss of business and
many others. Therefore, it is necessary for Computer Systems and Information
Security department to initiate motivation schemes to appreciate users’ contributions to
computer security (Herold 2005, p.35). Users tend to behave positively when they
know the return of their participation.

“Engagement communicates management’s respect for individuals and their ideas.”
(Kim & Mauborgne 2003)

In their three principles of “fair process”, Kim and Mauborgne (2003) insist on
employees’ involvement in making decisions that directly affect them. However, this
is opposite in security paradigm. Many organisations ignore users when implementing
security policies.
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3.7.4 Organisational culture
Central to successful of security awareness programme is the understanding of
organisational culture (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002; Desman 2002; Herold
2005). According to Herold (2005, pp.35-36) many employees fail to comply with
security policies because of their task deadlines and/or obeying their managers who tell
them to ignore security measures for the purpose of completing a specific task.
Following the former reason, management should understand that security comes with
baggage and hence they should loosen their controls. The need for periodic updating
anti-virus, performing patching and carefully analysing the legitimate of emails and
websites all these add responsibilities to employees.

Additionally, and which is more obviously, organisation’s support is fundamental
factor to all above parameters (Herold 2005, p.35). Enough funds must be allocated to
put them into operation. However, it is different when it comes to the real life.
According to the survey conducted by D’Arcy and Hovac (2007), security awareness
programmes had the lowest score. This suggests that although organisations invest
resources in developing security policies, they don’t devote extensive resources toward
educating users on the importance of compliance (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007).
Management, they see employees’ education on security issues as a waste of money.
They do not see a tangible benefit out of educating their employees on security issues.

3.8 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at investigating users’ involvement in security awareness and the
effectiveness of current security awareness programmes in educating users. In the
second section, the definition of security awareness and the relationship between
security awareness, training and education was discussed where it was pointed out that
security awareness is a central to the successfulness of computer security and
organisation’s prosperity as well. The framework on how to build security awareness
programme was described in section three where understanding of organisational
culture has been identified as the key to successful building security awareness
programme.
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In section four, the discussion of current security awareness approaches was presented.
Among these approaches are the integration of security awareness materials in
employment agreements, face-to-face, games and tools, and web-based. In this
discussion users’ involvement has been identified as very poor as a result many
approaches turn to be rigid focusing only with a subset of users and narrow computer
security threats. The discussion of computer security in developing and developed
countries was conducted in section five where it has been discovered that most of
developed countries are far behind in computer security.

In this chapter, poor security awareness material preparations and deliverance, and
ignorance in organisational culture and security culture has been identified as the key
factors for the failure of current security awareness programmes. It has been
discovered that many organisations buy on shelf security awareness materials without
performing need assessment. Moreover, the gap between security personnel and users
has also been identified as the driving force for failure of inconsideration of these
factors. Therefore, to resolve this, the next chapter provides the discussion of KMS
with emphasise on investigating key processes of knowledge management and
appropriate features of KMS that will be useful in improving security awareness.
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4

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

4.1 Introduction
Long before the birth of Knowledge Management, information was the most valuable
asset for the success of an organisation. Organisations were striving for efficient and
effective use of their information to gain competitive advantage. This was the era of
Management Information Systems (MIS). The central processing of information and
real time decisions were pertinent attributes of MIS. In contrast, things turned head-tail
when the concept of knowledge management emerged. The shift for competitive
advantage was toward how’s rather than what’s. Organisations started to realise the
benefit of intangible assets “Knowledge” over tangible assets “information”.

This was the transition period. Organisations were struggling to shift from productionbased to knowledge-based economy (Kim & Mauborgne 2003). Knowledge economy
is a type of economy where employees’ ideas and innovations are the catalysts for
organisational competitive gain. In this era, employees’ knowledge became the most
valuable asset. Much was invested to attract employees to offer what they have, and
encourage the coordination among themselves. Organisations started to look again at
their business; barriers between departments begun to be removed, new roles were
established, organisations’ rules and procedures were distorted or even new ones were
created, and new learning culture was introduced. However, to embrace all these new
type of support from technology and in particular computing was required.

This is when the other side of the coin appeared. The need for collaboration facilities,
wider range of accessibility and ability to store and maintain unstructured information
became the crucial attributes for new computer systems. This was the start of the era of
Knowledge Management Systems (KMS). KMS have become renowned for their
contributions in assisting employees to improve organisation’s performance so as
competitive advantages. Implementation of K’Netix in big organisation like Buckman
Laboratory is the implication of the benefits of KMS (Rumizen 1998; Bernard 2006).
On the other hand, computer security has been recognised into ensuring the privacy of
organisational knowledge (Randeree 2006). Therefore, since KMS have proven to be
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successful in organisations’ performance and computer security has been recognised in
ensuring organisational knowledge, then why not channel these two paradigms into
improving computer security awareness as well?

This chapter will investigate features of KMS and prerequisites for their
implementations in the context of computer security. To accomplish this, an extensive
literature will be covered to analyse Knowledge Management and its processes,
difficulties among these processes, available solutions to these problems and the role
technology plays. This chapter will conclude by highlighting useful features of KMS
in improving security awareness and its prerequisite for implementing it.

4.2 Knowledge Management
There is no doubt about the successfulness of KMS in improving organisational
performance. The antecedent behind this is the growing nature of technology
(Marwick 2001). The growing pool of Web 2.0 applications such as Wiki and Blogs
introduces more functionality that facilitates knowledge sharing in an enterprise wide.
O’Leary (2008) has discussed a lot about how Wiki can be a useful tool in facilitating
knowledge sharing within organisations. The existence of ICN ShareNet, a global
intranet of Siemens and Connect tool of BP are such examples of KMS that facilitates
collaborative events (Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001).

However, before the implementation of any KMS it is important to clearly understand
the key concepts of knowledge management, the activities of knowledge management
and how KMS facilitates these activities. Understanding Knowledge Management
processes, organisational cultural barrier, and organisational learning environment are
fundamentals for a successful implementation of KMS. Furthermore a KMS is to
work well within an organisational culture and support organisational learning, then
understanding the organisation is crucial.

Fundamental to KMS implementation is the understanding of Knowledge Management
processes (KM processes). KM processes explains pertinent procedures to be followed
to capture and make an effective use of employees’ knowledge. However, rushing into
discussing Knowledge Management processes without a proper understanding of its
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ingredients might lead to divergence of the concept. Therefore, this section will begin
by explaining what is meant by knowledge and Knowledge Management and finalise
with the core KM processes.

There is no single definition of knowledge. Depending on organisation’s perspectives,
knowledge can be defined in different ways (Fairchild 2002). There are those who
associate knowledge and information, and those who deny. Stenmark (2002) argues
that knowledge cannot be separated from its knower and "what can be articulated and
made tangible outside the human mind is merely information". On the other hand,
Marwick (2001) describes knowledge as experience and understanding of employees
in the form of information artefacts, such as documents and reports. However,
whichever the case knowledge is not information (Lang 2001). Information is all about
facts while knowledge is the combination of experience, heuristics, and owner’s beliefs
(Nonaka 1994). However, the differences between knowledge and information are
beyond the scope of this section, much has been discussed by McDermott (1999) on
their differences. Therefore, whatever the organisations’ perspectives about knowledge
are, what is fundamental for KMS’ implementation is whether knowledge can be
transferred from its owners into a computer system in a useful form.

Knowledge can be categorised in two forms: tacit and explicit. What has long been
built in human brain through experience or learning is categorised as tacit knowledge
(Marwick 2001). This type of knowledge is highly unstructured and difficulty to
maintain. On the other hand, the tacit knowledge that has been codified or extracted
from human brain is what considered as explicit knowledge (Marwick 2001). This type
of knowledge is highly simplified and easy to be maintained. All these forms of
knowledge are essential when it comes to organisation’s performance. Further
distinctions between tacit and explicit knowledge can be obtained from Table 3.
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Tacit Knowledge
(Subjective)
Knowledge of experience
(body)
Information
Simultaneous
knowledge
(here and how)
Analog knowledge (practice)

Explicit Knowledge
(Objective)
Knowledge of rationality
(mind)
Knowledge
Sequential knowledge
(there and then)
Digital
knowledge
(theory)

Table 3: Types of Knowledge
(Adapted from (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.61))

As organisations started to realise the contribution of knowledge in performance
increase and competitive advantage gain, knowledge management became an
organisational issue (Folkens & Spiliopoulou 2004). The focus was to collect, integrate
and reuse what an employee knows to bring about innovation and performance
increases in an organisation (Kim & Mauborgne 2003). Moreover, due to competitive
nature of the market, organisations need to be safe with their intellectual property
“knowledge”. Therefore, by capturing what is in employees’ head, organisations are
positioning themselves in a safe side.

However, as with the difficulties in defining knowledge, Knowledge Management also
has different perceptions. There are those who define Knowledge Management in
technological, sociological, and organisational perspectives (Tochtermann, Dosinger &
Puntschart 2004). Techno-centric focuses on tools and techniques to make Knowledge
Management happen while social-centric emphasises on human resources. Moreover,
organisational perspective sees knowledge as performance equalizer. However, since
computer security focuses on improving performance of an organisation and protecting
an organisation from external and internal threats, therefore organisational perspective
is most valuable to this dissertation and will be discussed in more detail.

Unfortunately, knowledge is messy (Allee 1997), it is tough to isolate Knowledge
Management from Sociological, Psychological and Technology disciplines (Falbo,
Arantes & Natali 2004). It is nearly impossible to talk about Knowledge Management
without associating it with human elements. Likewise in technology, though
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Knowledge Management is about people, but they need technology for effective
communications (Rao 2002). Moreover, central to successful Knowledge Management
is organisation’s support; therefore the organisation places itself at the centre of
Knowledge Management (Rao 2002).
4.2.1 Knowledge Management processes
Knowledge exists in many forms and derived from different sources within
organisations; human, e-mails, reports and many alike. Moreover, different roles
demands different knowledge (Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001). The knowledge
required by senior managers is quite different from those required by subordinates.
Furthermore, knowledge like any other asset expires (Nonaka 2005, p.188). Therefore,
it needs to be updated frequently to reflective the current organisational needs. In the
context of security, the knowledge that required by end-users is quite different with
those required by top-managers and security personnel as well. All these are issues that
need to be addressed in any KMS developed.

Many researchers have described knowledge management with different processes.
Benbya and colleagues (2004) describes knowledge management into four processes;
knowledge generation, integration, sharing and dissemination. Moreover, Alavi and
Leidner (1999) express knowledge management in four phases; creations, capture,
integrate and transfer. However, regardless the broadness of the description of
knowledge management processes, they all have a common perspectives. Therefore for
the purpose of this dissertation, four knowledge management processes will be
considered; knowledge capture, organise, store and share, see Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Knowledge Cycle

Knowledge Capture
Word processing has contributed much in knowledge capturing (Marwick 2001). It is
through word processing that we are writing and learning in colleges, project teams are
exchanging ideas through report and many alike. Knowledge capturing can be defined
as the process of articulating tacit knowledge from organisational knowledge worker
and/or external sources into a more persistent form that can be used in future(Marwick
2001; Nonaka 2005). However, technology is moving fast. Currently there are many
automated tools that can capture the know-how of knowledge worker for future use.
The emergent of voice recognition is a good example of these technologies (Marwick
2001).

However, there are barriers that must be overcome to convince knowledge worker to
share their knowledge. Knowledge workers tend to be busy, so they do not have
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enough time for socialisation or collaborative events. Moreover, the rigid
organisational culture that does not entertain social interactions also has impact on
knowledge sharing with organisations (Nonaka 2005, p.188). However, all these can
be resolved by changing organisational culture by shifting to learning culture, and by
introducing incentives to motivating knowledge workers to uncap their knowledge.
Knowledge Organise
As it was mentioned previously, articulated knowledge needs to be stored for future
use. However, prior to its storing, it need to be organised so as to facilitate easy
retrieve. Rao (2002) emphasises on the quality of knowledge content so as to reduce
content search time that can have negative impact on knowledge seekers. Moreover,
Alavi and Leidner (1999) commented on necessity for knowledge integration and
organisation in increasing organisational competitive advantage.
Knowledge Storage
Now that tacit knowledge has already been articulated and content has already
organised based on the domain, the next process of knowledge management is to store
the content in the format that can be inferred in the future. However, this process
resembles much with knowledge capturing. Unlike knowledge capturing, knowledge
storing take a steps further into providing security mechanisms in the environment
where there are many number of users. Moreover, knowledge storing provides
indexing mechanisms that facilitates easy retrieval of knowledge content. On the other
hand, knowledge capturing can be a traditional method of capturing tacit knowledge by
observation which it is hard for reusing.

Nonaka (2005, p.188) emphasises on context management of the stored knowledge
content. In knowledge storing it is not about how huge your knowledge repository is.
The crucial bit is the enough availability of knowledge context. This view is
inconsistent with Allee’s view that the more you pin down knowledge the more it slips
(Allee 1997). According to Nonaka (2005, p.188), poor contextual details of
knowledge content, it is viewed as being lost. Therefore, this emphasises on the
balance between the captured knowledge and the stored knowledge. Knowledge
content must not be summarised to the extent to loose its meaning.
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Knowledge Sharing
This is the backbone of knowledge creation (Nonaka 1995, p.56). According to Alavi
and Leidner (1999), knowledge is useless if it is not shared. The captured, organised
and stored knowledge must be accessible to employees at large to stimulate new
insights and innovations so as to improve the productivity of the organisation.
Knowledge sharing involves trust between employees (Lang 2001; Rao 2002). Again
this is an organisational culture problem. As it was explained previously, organisations
should encourage knowledge workers by introducing recognition award and loosening
it cultural norms.

Knowledge sharing involves knowledge searching and retrieval. There are two mostly
deployed model for knowledge retrieval; push and pull (Alavi & Leidner 1999;
Nonaka 2005). The pull model is a traditional model that involves search for and
retrieve of knowledge based on specific content keywords, while in push model
knowledge seeker is being notified on the posts of new knowledge content. For
instance, in Wiki based collaborative KMS, when a new member adds comments or
new content, each member is informed about the new “arrival”. On the other hand,
the former approach members do not receive any notifications about the content.
4.2.2 Knowledge transformation process
Central to the successful of organisation is how people exchange information and
communicate with one another in everyday company life (Davenport & Probst 2002,
p.111). This information, in terms of knowledge, comes into different forms and
members exchange this information in different ways. Employees interact with KMS
either as knowledge provider, seekers or intermediaries. Knowledge between them
circulates in different formats. Knowledge seekers retrieve articulated knowledge
while providers share their tacit knowledge with intermediaries ready to be fed in
KMS. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how different forms of knowledge can be
transformed within an organisation.
.
As mentioned previously, knowledge can broadly take two forms; tacit and explicit.
Tacit is what resides inside human brain while with explicit, it is any form of
knowledge that has been articulated from human brain (Marwick 2001). Furthering the
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notation of tacit-explicit, Nonaka and Takeuchi proposed a knowledge-conversions
model called SECI which has four processes, see figure 8 (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995,
pp.56-94). The model elaborates how different forms of knowledge can be captured
and created between employees within an organisation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995,
p.57). Therefore, it is worthwhile to bring its discussion in this section because for a
successful building KMS an understanding of how knowledge circulates within the
organisation is crucial.

Figure 8: Spiral of knowledge

Socialisation
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.62) defines socialisation as the process of creating
knowledge among employees by sharing their tacit knowledge. They went further and
ascertained that in this process knowledge can be shared within employees without
using any language. However, their view conflicts with Allees’ view (1997) that
knowledge travels via language, therefore without language it is impossible for
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knowledge sharing. Nonaka and Takeuchi overlooked that evening eyes blinking is
also a form of language. Therefore, following this view, it is correct to say that tacit
knowledge can also be shared without speaking or writing, but instead through
observation and practice (Gronau, Muller & Uslar 2004).

Knowledge is self-organising; it needs clear boundaries for it to succeed (Allee 1997).
On the other hand, management buy-ins is crucial for establishment of the clear path
for knowledge to flow within organisation (Bixler 2002). Therefore, it is necessary for
organisation to understand the needs for social activities within organisation. Much can
be exchanged during coffee break; employees have a good chance of exchanging what
they know during these meetings. Furthermore, this phase can be useful to determine
who shares what with whom.
Externalisation
In externalisation phase tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge. This is
when one tries to express her idea about something by either writing it down in
plaintext, drawing sketches, models or metaphors (Gronau, Muller & Uslar 2004). A
very common example of this form of knowledge conversion is during seminars or
proposal presentations. This is when knowledge can be captured for future use in
creating new insights (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.66).

However, this should go in parallel with the type of audience. Different user category
requires different approaches of material deliverance. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand the type of audience before planning for material to be delivered. This
directly associates with designing of KMS because one needs to understand different
mode of material presentation for targeted users.
Combination
Explicit knowledge exists in different forms in an organisation. They might be in email
as plaintext, images and/or video (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.67). In this phase, these
different formats of explicit knowledge are reformatted and combined to form more
meaningful knowledge. For instance, when systems analysts meet with designing
team, they combine their conceptual system models to form a blueprint of the final
system.
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This phase is essential in security context where different explicit knowledge from
different sources will need to be combined to educate users on security threats. These
sources might be external security experts, public security websites, anti-virus software
vendors and many alike. All these sources have different forms of explicit knowledge.
Therefore, this should be taken into account when designing KMS.
Internalisation
This is explicit-to-tacit knowledge conversion. What has been articulated and stored in
knowledge base need to be accessed and probably create new insights. The tacit
knowledge that has been digitised from externalisation and combination phases is
accessed by other employees to help them deal with the problem in hand. This is what
is termed as learn-from-past.

However, this directly associates with the knowledge content. Rao (2002) emphasises
on organisational participatory approach in validating knowledge content. It is this
content that determines the successful of KMS. Knowledge is made for people
therefore it should reflect their needs by having relevant material.

4.3 Organisational learning
In the previous sections, section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, much has been discussed about what
it takes for knowledge to be shared and created among employees. However, there is a
lot to knowledge sharing and creation. There must be a favourable environment that
will enable smooth knowledge sharing. This section focuses on how to go about
getting employees to participate in making organisation knowledge being utilised to its
perfections.

In an organisational context, knowledge is useless without sharing, so as in
information security (Alavi & Leidner 1999). Introducing computer security to
employees’ daily activities is like adding burden to their tasks. Without proper
arrangements to prepare them in participating in computer security knowledge sharing,
things could fall apart. Therefore, it is mandatory to understanding the ingredients of
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organisational learning so as to combat ourselves with the heavy task that we have
ahead of us.
4.3.1 What is organisational learning?
Prior to delving into the ingredients of organisational learning, it is crucial to clearly
understand what it meant by organisational learning. The term organisational learning
and learning organisation are used interchangeably. While learning organisation
express the environment where learning activities are undertaken, organisational
learning express the actual process of learning (Denton 1999, p.16). Denton (1999,
p.17) defines organisational learning as the process of improving actions through
which new ideas and innovations are built and shared to create better knowledge and
understand. However, the discussion on what constitutes learning organisation and
organisational learning is beyond the scope of this section. This section will only
concentrates on what constitute on organisational learning.

Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.44) proposed two types of learning activities. They
argued that the first learning activities concentrates on creating know-how for specific
problem domain while the second type of learning involves establishing new beliefs to
wipe out the existing ones. However, for the purpose of this dissertation all these types
are of importance since employees within an organisation need to be combated with
specific knowledge of fighting against computer threats while they also need to pass
past their previous beliefs that computer security is not of their concerns. In short,
organisation that need to improve its performance it must introduce learning
environment that will change its employees from being egocentric to altruistic.

Denton (1999, p.20) proposed six reasons to why an organisation should shift to
learning process. These includes shift to production factors, acceptance of knowledge
asset, volatility nature of business, dissatisfaction among managers and employees, the
increase of competitive nature and high customers’ bargaining power. All these
reasons are applicable to the problem domain of this dissertation. However, the
volatility nature of business fits more with computer security domain. Computer
threats are evolving in unimaginably speed.
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4.3.2 Senge’s organisational learning process
Understanding what it meant by organisational learning, and its difference from
learning organisation is not enough to introduce learning process within an
organisation. Having spotted this illness, Senge (1990) proposed a practical approach
of organisational learning model. According to Senge, for an organisation to shift to
learning environment it needs to undergo five steps. Therefore, the whole of this
section will concentrate on exploring what constitutes in each step. However, it should
also be noted that the order in which these steps are does not matter.


Personal mastery

Lang (2001) argues that “It is knowledge that holds a firm together” and organisations
learn from employees’ participation in communities that have philosophy, practice and
formal means of communication. It is therefore prudent for organisation to understand
employees’ contributions in organisational competitive gain, and support these
communities. However, employees also must play their role in participating in their
growth and development plans (Senge & Audio 1990).

Dervitsiotis (1998) defines personal mystery as a continually discipline of sharpening
our knowledge. It is clear from the definition that emphasis is on ever-ending process
of learning. However, as previously pointed out, organisation’s management must
appreciate employees’ contribution by facilitating learning activities, while on the
other hand employees are responsible for participating in learning process. Therefore,
the process of knowledge creation relies on employees with little input from
management.


Shared vision

“…share knowledge involves uncapping our thinking processes for others in the
present moment” (Lang 2001). This statement emphasises on community
consciousness. If employees open to others what they think it is valuable for
organisation, they can share and discuss different views and come up with a
community decision “shared vision”. In other words, shared vision is a common view
for community members.
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Senge (1990) argues if there is shared view, employees feel the sense of ownership and
thus lead to unlocking of their ideas and open the gateway for innovations. This
discipline has some affinity with three principle of fair process (Kim & Mauborgne
2003). The principle emphasises on employees’ engagement, explanation and
expectations clarity. Engagement emphasises on employees participations, while
explanation emphasises on awareness and expectations clarity emphasises on
management decision stability.


Mental models

According to Senge (1990, p.235) mental models are the image, assumptions and
stories which we carry in our mind. It is this models that make people judge things
differently. Mental models associates with human belief and it is this belief that
change the attitude of someone. Mental models are also generative (Senge 1990,
p.242). However, mental model are difficult to exercise, it need a plenty of time to
create and master similar views in a team.


Systems thinking

“...find a solution, not culprit” (Senge & Audio 1990). Do not delve to wash oil drop
from a car without knowing the hole and root cause of it. This discipline emphasises
on finding the solution to a problem and not solves the problem at first glance. This
discipline is similar to Root Cause Analysis, a problem solving technique that
emphasises on determining the original cause prior to solving the problem. .

This is the core of organisational learning. All disciplines we have so far explained are
not enough without system thinking. As emphasised by Senge (1990), system thinking
discipline is a fusion point of other remaining disciplines.


Team learning

According to Senge and Audio (1990) team learning is the process of aligning and
developing the capacity of a team to create the results its members truly desire. Senge
(1990), argues that team learning has three critical dimensions in organisation; the
need to brainstorm about complex problem, creating innovations and as the member of
other learning teams. However, there is no such morale within organisations. Team
learning fits in sports like teams.
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Contrary, Senge (1990) argues that with this nature of business, team learning is badly
needed within organisations. He emphasises that the successful of an organisation is
dependent to the successfulness of such teams within the organisation.

Now we know what knowledge management, with its processes, is capable of. We
know many, if not all, barriers that can hinder us from utilising the fruits of knowledge
management. Fortunately, Senge has provided us with the way to overcome these
barriers. However, the problem still persists; how can we apply Senge’s discipline to
overcome these barriers? Nonaka (1994, p.188), proposed the introduction of
community of practice as a solution. Therefore the next section will discuss how
community of practice can resolve these barriers.
4.3.3 Communities of Practice
For an organisation to be successful knowledge must be shared within its members,
knowledge that is not shared is useless (Alavi & Leidner 1999). But the problem is,
how can an organisation make its employee share what they have? Through motivating
them with rewards, or impressing them with sophisticated technologies? Though all
these approaches have credibility, employees tend to learn more through participation
in small groups of people who interact regularly (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.108).
Therefore, it is necessary for organisation to understand and support human
relationships within their organisations.

The phenomenon of Communities of Practice (CoP) emerged in 1990’s when a study
to investigate group of Xerox technicians proved that employees tend to behave
differently when they work into groups (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.117). The study
showed that there are differences between work procedures and the actual working
procedures. The study explained Xerox’s technicians when faced with technical
problems. Technicians tend to ignore technical manuals and instead seek for help from
their colleagues (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.117).

Knowledge is about people, if well managed then they will be able to share what they
have and adopt that trend. Allee (1997) argues that knowledge seeks community.
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Moreover, Lave and Wegner (1991) defines community of practices as collaborative,
interactive networks of individuals who have the same mission of learning about a
problem domain of a specified scope. All these emphasise on the fact human
relationships within organisations is a crucial attitude to practice. To emphasise on
this, Lang (2001) argues that in order for organisation to succeed, Knowledge
Management should exhale its boundaries and establish human relationship.

Lave and Wenger (1991) argues that CoP can be differentiated from ordinary
communities like groups or teams by three unique characteristics; domain, community,
and practice. Domain explains the scope of the community whereas Community
explains the way member of the community gather to discuss their matters. Moreover,
Practice explains specialisation of the community. These characteristics differentiate
CoP from other communities because in groups like team-fans they do not have
common practices.

For instance, the CoP formulated by Knowledge Mapping and Structuring Unit at
Unilever originated from food production company with the aim of enhancing
efficiency in production and improve innovative processes. The CoP was organised
due to the need of new production. After member being assigned, they were brought in
a one week workshop to discuss different strategies in solving the problem at hand
(Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001). The italicised words explain the domain, practice
and community of the CoP as proposed by Lave and Wenger (1991).

CoP can be formulated using two approaches; bottom-up and top-down approaches.
Davenport and Probst (2002, p.109) explains bottom-up approach as a CoP initiative
that lead to the establishment of a formal CoP within an organisation. This explanation
can be associated with the establishment of central office for the interlinking of
knowledge management activities at Siemens. At Siemens, this approach was initiated
by informal committed members of Knowledge Management staff. This approach
normally has positive feedback because they are initiated by the doers.

On the other hand, top-down approach is the CoP initiative from top managers to
subordinates. This explanation can be associated with Unilever CoP (Andriessen &
Huis in 't Veld 2001). At Unilever, management prepared a team by selecting on expert
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who is committed and ten to twenty other members to join the CoP. However, this
approach mostly fails because employees feel to be dragged, unless the management is
smart enough to know when and how to formulate the CoP.

Since CoP comprises of members with specific objectives, therefore to establish CoP
there must be some processes to be followed. Whatever the approach, bottom-up or
top-down, there are must be an initiator of the community who needs to sale his idea
about what he intends to do and for what purpose. If other employees buy the idea,
then follows the actual execution of the community. However, the execution of the
community need to be evaluated, if it meets the CoP’s objectives and fulfils members’
desires then the community continues to operate, and if not then it has to end.
These processes are what Davenport and Probst (2002, p.109) referred to as CoP
lifecycle. In their explanation, they suggested that a CoP falls into three phases for
their operations. As it can be seen on figure 9, CoP comprises of three phases; start-up,
run and improve, and wind-down phase, each with different operations. The
explanation of each phase will be provided below.

Figure 9: CoP Lifecycle
(Adapted from (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.149))



Start-up

This is the awareness phase where members of the community are being told the
purpose of the CoP and its scope. This normally is being done by base members of the
community. The community leaders are being selected and members establish their
mode of conducting their meetings. Though, if the community is virtually, instead
members will define the technology to assist their meetings.
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Run and improve

This is the operational phase. This is when the community come into actual execution
of the community. This is the actual knowledge sharing and creation phase where
members meet for solving the problem in hand. However, constant monitoring of the
community will be performed in this phase to make sure it operates with its objectives.


Wind-down

Community should exist as long as it serves its purposes. Based on the evaluation, the
community may be closed down and the knowledge created in the knowledge base
copied and transferred into another CoP or being stored for future use. Meanwhile, if
the community happen to fulfil and excel its objectives then it will continue to exist.

4.4 Computing for Knowledge Management
Knowledge is power and by sharing we add more into it. Consider a very simple
scenario where employee ‘A’ happens to have a problem in login into her account and
after consulting employee ‘B’, he discovered that the problem was a buffer overflow.
After a simple demonstration from employee ‘B’, she managed to fix the problem.
From this scenario, two components of Knowledge Management are regarded to be
essential for performance improvement; knowledge sharing and creation. Employee
‘B’ agreed to share his knowledge about how to clear buffer overflow while employee
‘A’ learned how to fix the problem so it would not bother her if it happens again.

However, two essential questions arise from this scenario. The first question is how do
employees communicate their problems with their colleagues, and second, if they
manage to communicate, in whichever way, how is the shared knowledge going to be
captured for reuse? This adds a third component for improving organisational
performance; knowledge reuse. Knowledge is a valuable asset that needs to be
managed like, or even more than, any other assets. Today employee ‘B’ is there to
answer the queries, but what about tomorrow? Would he be there when he is needed?

“Prevention is better than cure”; it is a common axiom that we have been gossiping in
our life, but yet we fail to practice its context when it is required to. Tomorrow is
beyond our scope; anything can happen. Employee ‘B’ might quit the job, or even be
68

in a short holiday where he can not be reached. Whichever the reasons, proactive
measures must be taken by making “back ups” of whatever has contributed to the
improvement of organisational performance. However, this does not only put the
organisation in a safe side, but also quantifies organisation’s capabilities. From the
“backups”, new strategies can be initiated.

Although knowledge sharing, creation and reuse have been identified as fundamental
components for performance improvement, still there are a lot that need to be done to
make them alive. Organisational cultural change is of the most common prerequisite
for their effective execution. The barriers between employees must be resolved; they
should be opened and understand the benefits of sharing. However, the organisational
cultural change is beyond the scope of this section, only enablers of the identified
components will be discussed in this section.

Unfortunately, you can not make somebody to create new knowledge. The process of
knowledge creation is the association of learning process and the learner. Therefore,
the process of knowledge creation is ignored in this section. In other words, there are
no technological enablers for making someone instil new knowledge. This section will
conclude by identifying the roles technology plays in enabling the execution of these
components as recognised in literature.
4.4.1 Computing overview
Prior to answering the questions arouse in the previous scenario, it is worthwhile to
investigate what it meant by computing and identify generic roles of computing in
Knowledge Management. Fairchild (2002) defines Knowledge Management enablers
as structures and attributes that must be in place for a successful knowledge
management program. Although KPMG (2000) and Rao (2002) proposed eight
enablers of knowledge management, this section will only concentrate with
technological enabler.

Building on Oxford’s definition, computing is the action or practice of using
computers. Computer provides massive storage of data and high processing speed.
Incorporated with its applications, intranet, internet and other web applications,
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computers reduces the gap of space and hence makes communication easier. In
summary, computers can provide massive storage of information, high information
manipulation speed, and global communication and also provides with searching
capabilities which can be useful if applied to Knowledge Management processes.

It is true that knowledge sharing can stand on its own without the help of technology.
However, to be effectively technology must be there to support its capture and
organisational wide accessibility (Rao 2002; Alavi & Leidner 1999). Stenmark (2002)
argues, "…for KMS to be successful they must include users and provide mechanisms
for these users to locate and interact with each other". The issue of technology
resonates most in an enterprise environments where knowledge need to be centrally
stored and its accessibility need to be enhanced to reach employees at large.

The concept of computing for Knowledge Management can be explained using C3S
model as proposed by the author (2008). In his work, the author described four roles
computing plays in Knowledge Management; capture, store, search and share, as
shown in figure 10. This view is in the same line with that of Alavi and Leidner (1999)
that Knowledge Management requires database and database management,
communication and messaging, and browsing and retrieval technologies. However,
they ignored the technology for knowledge capturing.

The first component of the C3S model is Capture which reflects the category of
technologies that are useful in knowledge acquisition process, these includes video and
audio capturing devices. The second component is Store which presents all
technologies that are useful in knowledge storing, these includes knowledge base, data
management systems. The third category, which includes expert locators and yellow
pages, are represented by Search component of the model. The final component,
Share, reflects all collaborative technologies that assist in knowledge sharing, these
includes Web 2.0 applications and intranet.
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Figure 10: C3S Model

However, both these technologies can be combined into two categories. Hansen and
colleagues (2005) argues technology can support Knowledge Management in two
basic approaches; codification and personalisation. In codification, unstructured
knowledge is transformed and stored into common format for future use. It combines
all technologies that fall under Capture and Store components of C3S model. This
approach proves to be more useful because it build a gap between capture and store;
once knowledge has been captured it has been stored already. However, it is also
should be noted that knowledge capturing does not always implies that knowledge is
being stored.

Moreover, personalisation approach focuses on enabling two parties to communicate
by both providing means of searching for experts and direct communicating with them.
Again this approach proves to be useful because it plays twofold roles. Firstly it allows
for expert searching and secondly it enables two parties to directly communicate. The
C3S model considers search and share as two separate entities, but logically we search
for expert because we want to communicate with them. Therefore, these two
components must go hand to hand.

However, the codification approach is dependent to personalisation approach. If for
instance Web 2.0 is applied as the means of establishing communication between two
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ends, therefore the knowledge will be stored in the form of plaintext, video and audio
but it differs when the technology changes. If the technology applied change to, for
instance video and audio capturing systems, then text format would not be applicable.
Therefore, based on the above exploration, the approach proposed by Hansen and
colleagues (2005) will be applied as a guideline for answering the questions below as
aroused from the scenario of section 4.4.
4.4.2 How do emplo yees communicate their problems?
This question can be answered by the personalisation approach. As previously
explained technological enabler in this question serves dual roles. Firstly, by providing
employee “A” with search capabilities to search for the right person to consult, and
then it enables the communication of the two ends; employee “A” and “B”. Mosaic of
technological enablers can be applied in this question, these includes expert locator,
yellow pages, direct phone line, email and collaboration tools like Web 2.0 and
intranet.

Thanks to the advancement of technology. Technology have made the world as a
single village, therefore technology removes the gap of space that otherwise would
limit knowledge sharing (Marwick 2001). However, mush should be considered for the
case of material accessibility and not direct communication with the expert. In
enterprise environment where there are many roles and knowledge accessibility is
sensitive, there should be a mechanisms to prevent unauthorised access. With User
Profiling capability of technology, each user can be assigned limited privileges to
access the contents based on their roles.
4.4.3 How is the shared knowledge going to be captured for reuse?
This can be answered with the first approach, codification approach. Recap, in
codification, unstructured knowledge is transformed and stored into common format
for future use. As previously explained this approach is dependant to personalisation
approach. Whichever the technology applied in personalisation approach, the most
common technologies are database and database management, knowledge base,
knowledge repository, content and data management and many alike.
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In an enterprise environment where knowledge comes from different domains,
organising of this knowledge is of essential so as to facilitate its fast retrieval (Rao
2002). In associate with this approach, other categories of technologies are being
applied. These technologies include taxonomy, thesaurus and metadata. Their main
task is content organisation based on domain, practice and owner of that document.

Moreover, knowledge tends to vary with time. What was useful today, tomorrow it
might be obsolete. Therefore, codification technologies must be capable to allow these
changes. The underlying technology must be able to allow periodic amendments of the
content in totality or portion of it. It should also keep track of who, when and where
the modifications occurred.

4.5 Knowledge management systems
The economy has changed from product-based to knowledge-based. In knowledgebased economy, knowledge has been identified as a valuable asset to improve
organisation’s performance and competitive gain as well. However, the challenge
arouse on how to convince knowledge workers to uncap what they have and share with
others in an organisation. In an organisational context, knowledge is limited if it is not
shared within employees. Many researchers proposed the need of learning activities to
facilitate knowledge sharing. In 1990 Senge proposed a model for assisting
organisation to shift into learning organisation.

Many researchers suggest the use of technology to assist in learning environment
(Bixler 2002; Rao 2002; Malhotra 2005). Pondering on the matter, author (2008), and
Hansen and colleagues (2005) proposed models that can be used to categorise
technologies that required for facilitating knowledge sharing within an organisational
context. Author (2008) proposed C3S model that focus on categorising technologies
for knowledge capturing, storing, searching and sharing. Moreover, Hansen and
colleagues (2005) categorised technologies for knowledge codification and
personalisation. However none of these models established the connection between
technology and KMS as Knowledge Management initiatives. Therefore, this section
will focus on exploring what constitute to KMS and its applicable features into
assisting knowledge sharing.
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4.5.1 Types of Knowledge Management S ystems
In an organisational context, KMS are perceived as a central knowledge bank that
keeps records of all past successful examples in solving a specific problem (Bernard
2006). Alavi and Leidner (1999) define KMS as a new breed of computer applications
that focus on creating, gathering, organising, and disseminating organisational
knowledge.

KMS differ from ordinary transactional systems like MIS in a number of ways.
Information, which is in term of knowledge, is stored in an unstructured way in KMS
(Bernard 2006). Moreover, unlike MIS, there exists only three categories of roles that
interacts with KMS; knowledge seekers, providers and intermediaries (Markus 2001).
Knowledge seekers are those who refer to the already existing knowledge, while
knowledge providers are domain experts “knowledge workers”. On the other hand,
knowledge intermediaries are those who are responsible for maintaining knowledge
content (Markus 2001).

As it was mentioned previously technology plays two essential roles in knowledge
creation process. It enables knowledge providers to directly share their “know-how’s”
with knowledge seekers. Moreover, it also enables knowledge intermediary to
structure knowledge providers’ “know-how’s” into useful format that can be easily
retrieved in future by themselves, knowledge seekers or knowledge intermediary as
well.

However, each of the scenarios explained in the previous paragraph depends on a
specific or combination of technologies. For instance, technology that can be used for
personalisation can never replace the technology for codification, but still they can be
combined to operate in ad hoc environment. Therefore it is plausible to understand
different categories of Knowledge Management “generators”.

Although there are many types of KMS, Bernard (2006) proposed three categories of
KMS generators which can effectively be used to categorise KMS. In his article,
Bernard explains that generators are the go-by of applications, and are these
applications which we are interested with. Therefore, this section the generators
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explained by Bernard are going to be used as the framework to describe different types
of KMS.


Knowledge repositories

King and colleagues (2002) defines knowledge repositories as databases that allow the
storage and retrieval of knowledge content. These include data warehousing, document
repositories, document management system (Hahn & Subramani 2000; Marwick
2001). Davenport, De Long & Beers (1998) went further to categorise knowledge
repositories into three categories; external, structural internal and informal internal.
External knowledge repositories for the storage of intellectual intelligence while
structural internal repository such as research reports, marketing material and
techniques and methods. Moreover, informal internal repositories are for storage and
retrieval of business best practices (King, Marks Jr & McCoy 2002).


Expert directories

These are tools that are specifically for finding knowledge workers. These include
expert networks, yellow pages, expert database and many alike. Unlike knowledge
repositories, expert directory only stores information about the expert (Hahn &
Subramani 2000). However, other expert directories both find people with knowledge
that one requires and enable it to be transferred to the knowledge seekers. These tools
that locate the destination of experts are referred to yellow pages.


Collaborative tools

These are tools that assist access between users (Hahn & Subramani 2000). These
types of tools include discussion forums, Wiki, Portals, video conferencing and many
alike. The unique feature that distinguishes this category with the previous is the
ability to facilitate collaboration events.
4.5.2 Selecting appropriate tools KMS
Having a tool without knowing where to apply it, it is like the tool does not exist at all.
One should understand where it should be applied so as to make it effective. Due to
successful

of

KMS

into

improving

organisation

performance,

many KM

“applications” have emerged. However, the burden to select between these tools is left
to Knowledge Managers (Hahn & Subramani 2000). Hahn and Subramani argue that
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managers need to be directed to what scenario does specific category of KMS is
suitable.

Tackling this problem, Kankanhalli and colleagues (2003) proposed product-service
approach to assist executives in choosing the right KMS to deploy in their
management initiatives. In this approach they associate KMS with the type of the
organisation. They classified organisation in two classes; product-based and servicebased. They went further and split the organisation in two subclasses; high-volatile and
low-volatile. The first category differentiates the organisations based on their nature
while the latter classification explains how un/stable organisation is with its nature.
Therefore an organisation can be categorised as product-based and high-volatile. This
means it is a production organisation that often changes its products.

Figure 11: Product-Service KMS Support Model



Product-Based Organisations in Low-Volatility Context

As shown on Figure 11, this category reflects organisations that their competitive force
is based on products. These organisations mainly depend on tacit knowledge and tend
to have a lot of informal and formal CoP’s. Therefore all organisation that fall in this
category, and if they fully depend on tacit knowledge, then personalisation approach is
suitable
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Product-Based Organisations in High-Volatility Context

All organisations that operate in an environment where the rate of innovation is high
and products are associated with many deadlines, knowledge need to be provided in a
real time manner. In this category both types of KMS are suitable to make sure
knowledge is available in a required timeframe.


Service-Based Organisations in a Low-Volatility Context

In this category, the wealth of knowledge accumulated by these organisations and the
ability to use this knowledge to serve their clients is a key value proposition. Therefore
KMS required in this category is for knowledge content storage.


Service-Based Organisations in a High-Volatility Context

In this category service is their competitive force and business environment is
dynamic. Therefore the time required for knowledge content is crucial. Therefore this
approach can adopt personalisation approach like face-to-face communications.

This approach has proved to be useful because prior to selecting for KMS, it considers
the nature of the organisation by looking at competitive driving forces. It reflects real
operations of the organisations.

4.6 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at investigating key processes of knowledge management and
appropriate features of KMS in improving security awareness. The discussion of
fundamentals of knowledge management is provided in section two where both
knowledge management processes and knowledge transformation process are
discussed. In this discussion, organisational culture has been identified as a central to
successful of KMS implementation. In section three, the discussion of organisational
learning has been conducted where CoPs has been identified as the key solution to
overcome organisational cultural barriers in implementing KMS.

The discussion of the usefulness of computing in knowledge management has been
conducted in section four where four roles of technology have been identified in
relation to knowledge management. These roles include capture, store, search and
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share where capture describes all technologies that are useful in knowledge capturing,
and so forth. The description of KMS and its criterion of selecting what category to be
implemented in a specific organisation were provided in section five. In this
discussion, three features of KMS has been identified; repository, expert directory and
collaborative.

In this chapter, employees’ knowledge sharing and the roles KMS plays in facilitating
organisational learning have been identified as the driving factors for improving
organisation’s performance. However, knowledge sharing constitutes many knowledge
management processes and different features of KMS apply in different scenarios.
Therefore, the next chapter provides the discussion of knowledge management
perspectives of security awareness emphasising on how KMS can be useful in
improving security awareness.
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5

THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
OF SECURITY AWARENESS

5.1 Introduction
There is no doubt that high security awareness decreases the number of computer
break-ins because users starts practicing and applying good security traits (Sharp 2007,
p.3). However, there is more into improving users’ awareness in security issues than
just the dissemination of security policies and expecting users to immediately adopt
require practice. From preceding chapters it is evident that many of the issues to be
dealt with in security awareness are concerned with the human element and effectively
sharing knowledge among the human element and protecting the knowledge of the
organisation.

This chapter explores the issues of security awareness and developing security
awareness programmes from a knowledge management perspective. The factors which
influence security awareness are discussed from knowledge management perspective.
Since one of the key areas identified for failure of current security awareness is
organisational culture and security culture in particular, this chapter discusses the
issues involved and in particular organisational learning in the context of security
awareness. The chapter concludes by linking the problems to current security
awareness to the appropriate knowledge management issues and activities that can be
used to address these.

5.2 Why is Security Awareness a KM Problem?
Shapr (2007, p.3) proposed three factors that must be considered to ensure users are
aware with computer threats:
•

Knowledge: The user knows of the existence of a potential problem with
respect to safety or security – for example, she knows that a computer virus
may be spread by e-mail;

•

Understanding: The user understands how to deal with a safety or security
problem – for example, she knows that a virus scanner can be used to detect
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and remove virus from incoming e-mail, and knows how to install and set up
such a scanner;
•

Compliance: The user acts correctly in order to avoid a safety or security
problem – for example, she in fact installs and sets up a virus scanner to detect
and remove virus from incoming e-mail.

Senge (1990) emphasises on team learning and shared vision. Team learning
emphasises on aligning and developing the capacity of a team to create the desired out,
while shared vision emphasise on community view. Therefore, security personnel and
users as a team should share their knowledge to create desired output as a team, and
they should help each other as a team to build the same view on fighting against
computer threats. If they work together as a team, security policies compliance will
definitely increase so as computer security.

5.3 Organisational security culture
As it was pointed out in chapter 3, users’ are treated as a separate entity when it comes
to security. They are not involved when it comes to security decision making. Security
awareness materials are prepared without users’ input as result security awareness
programme(s) turn out to be unsuccessful. On the other hand, researchers emphasises
on security and organisational culture consideration when building security awareness
programme(s) but things are vice-versa when it comes to actual implementation.
Security awareness programme(s) are channelled into communications media that are
not convenient for all levels of employees. All these emphasise the gap that exists
between security personnel and end-users.

Central to all these is security organisational culture. Organisations need to shift to
security learning environment to resolve the gap between end-users and security
personnel. The battle between bad guys and good guys is an endless battle. While one
side concentrate on providing tight control measures, the other side keeps their eyes
wide open to seek for a breakthrough (Robila & Ragucci 2006). Therefore
organisations need to build teamwork to harness employees’ skills to fighting against
this battle (Schlienger & Teufel 2003). If this gap will be resolved then computer
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security will be an organisational issue and hence decrease the rate of computer threats
and break-ins.

Fortunately, human element is a precious asset in knowledge management. As it was
described in chapter 4, central to the success of organisation is employees’ knowledge
sharing with KMS at the centre of it. Knowledge management emphasises on
overcoming negative cultural elements by introducing learning environment, while on
the other hand KMS are champions on facilitating learning environment. Therefore,
since the solution for failure of security awareness programme(s) is users’ involvement
in security decision making, and shifting to security learning environment has been
proposed to resolve the gap between end-users and security personnel, KMS will then
be perfect facilitator for security knowledge capturing, organising, storing and sharing
between users and security personnel.

However, it is worthwhile exploring security learning cycles to have a clear picture of
what constitutes in it. Therefore, this section discusses Security Learning Continuum
as proposed by American’s National Institute of Standards and Technology and
Security Learning Cycle proposed by Microsoft. NIST’s approach is preferred because
it is a standard body for American’s private and organisational agencies. Therefore it is
a good benchmarking. Moreover, Microsoft was included in this section because of the
influence it has in computer systems security. The strategies will be assessed and
findings will be incorporated into the framework developed as part of this dissertation
which will be discussed later.
5.3.1 NIST’s Securit y Learning Continuum
The National Institute of Standards and Technology was originally founded as the
National Bureau of Standards in 1901, works to strengthen U.S. industry’s
competitiveness; advance science and engineering; and improve public health, safety,
and the environment. In 1988, NIST was established by the US congress with the duty
to assist, improve, modernise, ensure reliability and facilitate rapid commercialisation
of products based on new scientific discoveries (NIST-SP 800 – 16 1998).

81

The basic function of NIST, of which it is the main concern of this section, is to
develop, maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement, and
provide the means and methods for comparing standards used in science, engineering,
manufacturing, commerce, industry, and education with the standards adopted or
recognised by the Federal Government (NIST-SP 800 – 16 1998).
NIST describes security learning as a continuum. It describes the process of learning
starting with security awareness then to security learning and finalises with security
education and experience, see figure 12. The model describes the mandatory route to
be followed to acquire necessary computer systems’ security knowledge. Therefore if
someone wishes to change to or being assigned with different role, then he/she must
follow the model to acquire necessary knowledge for that specific role.

Since the relationship between security awareness, security training, and education and
experience has already been discussed in section 3.2.2, therefore this section only
concentrates on their briefly descriptions in the context of this model. However,
detailed explanation focuses on the description of the inner-steps between each phase
of the model.
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Figure 12: Security Learning Continuum
(Source: (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003))

As shown on figure 12, security awareness determines execution of the remaining
phases of the model. Since the model mirrors necessary steps to be followed to acquire
necessary security knowledge, and since it is the first element in the model therefore
there is no exception for its attending. Security awareness target all users regardless
their roles and expertise. It is this phase where users are being prepared, by changing
their behaviours, for the next level of learning continuum.
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As it was explained in the previously, security awareness focuses on changing users’
behaviour on computer security so as to fulfil defined security requirements. Security
training, on the other hand, focuses on imparting users with appropriate knowledge and
skills to deal with specific computer systems’ problems. Therefore to resolve the
knowledge gap, there must be a transitional stage; “Security Basics and Literacy”.

Not everybody in the organisation is a computer expert or working with computer
systems, unless it is a computer related organisation. In training phase, only computer
systems’ experts and anybody who interacts with computer systems are targeted.
Therefore, “Security Basics and Literacy” focuses in preparing computer systems
technical users with basic knowledge and skills that are required to be emphasised in
security training. Notice here, the material prepare are also quite different with those
used in user awareness phase so as with training material.

After “Security Basics and Literacy,” training becomes focused on providing
knowledge, skills, and abilities specific to an individual’s “Roles and Responsibilities
Relative to IT Systems.” At this level, training recognises differences between
beginning, intermediate, and advanced skill requirements.

The "Education and Experience” level focuses on developing the ability and vision to
perform complex multi-disciplinary activities and the skills needed to further the IT
security profession and to keep pace with threat and technology changes.
5.3.2 Microsoft Securit y Learning C ycle
After realising its potentials computer systems security, Microsoft contributed to the
body of knowledge by proposing a security learning cycle which intends to assist its
customers by providing a security learning framework. This framework can be used by
computer systems administrators and security experts as a guideline into building
security culture with their organisations. The framework comprises two fundamental
components; awareness and training, see figure 13.

The former component focuses on changing user’s behaviour (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007;
Microsoft 2006) while the latter only focuses on creating new skills (Microsoft 2006).
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The first component tells user what and how to meet organisation’s security standards
and procedures while the second component teaches user with enough skills to deal
with specific security problems. As noted by Microsoft, the initial point of the cycle is
awareness then followed by training.

Figure 13: Information security learning lifecycle
(Adapted from (Microsoft 2006))

Therefore, based on security learning cycle, knowledge capturing, storing and sharing
of KM processes and repository and collaborative nature of KMS has been highlighted
as appropriate features for improving security awareness within an organisational
context. However, for the purpose of this dissertation, the description of KMS
usefulness will focus only on security awareness. Knowledge capturing process is
useful in articulating security issues from both knowledge seekers and providers while
knowledge storing is useful for storing security knowledge contents. On the other hand,
knowledge sharing facilitates searching and retrieving of knowledge content.
Moreover, repository nature of KMS facilitates capturing, organising, and storing of
knowledge content, while collaborative nature of KMS facilitates the actual knowledge
sharing.

From the literature review it was pointed out that user’ involvement, poor material
preparation and delivery, ignorance of organisational and security culture are among
the reasons to why current security awareness programme fail. Therefore, in solving
these problems, a KMS framework will be developed to guide the development of
KMS in improving security awareness. However, prior to framework development, the
results from the survey will also considered on the development of the framework.
Thereafter a Wiki-based KMS prototype will be developed to evaluate the contribution
of KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational context.
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In resolving all these, prior to the implementation of Wiki-based KMS prototype for
security awareness, the framework considers computer security perceptions and
security culture by including these as factors to determine the level of change
management. It is the change management that focus on resolving the gap between
executives, security experts and users by educating them the necessity of knowledge
sharing and their contribution in corporate security. On the other hand, organisational
culture is considered to resolve any conflicts with organisation interests so as to define
appropriate type of KMS to facilitate security knowledge sharing between members of
all levels.

5.4 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at describing how KMS can be useful in improving security
awareness. The second section provided the discussion of why security awareness is
being perceived as a knowledge management problem. In this discussion
organisational learning as identified in chapter four has been mapped with
organisational security culture to allow the applicability of KMS. The discussion of
organisational security culture was provided in section three where two security
learning cycles were discussed.

In this chapter, knowledge capturing, storing and sharing of knowledge management,
and repository and collaborative features of KMS were identified as the key solution to
the improvement of security awareness. The next chapter provides the description of
security awareness survey emphasising on the roles users play in computer security
and the effectiveness of current security awareness programmes in educating users.
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6

SECURITY USER AWARENESS SURVEY

6.1 Introduction
Although much has been covered in the previous chapters about the research problem,
obtaining industrial views is worthwhile. To achieve this an investigation was
undertaken designed with the aim of investigating the roles users play in computer
systems security and the effectiveness of current security user awareness programmes
into educating users in security relevant issues. To achieve this both questionnaires and
structured interviews were conducted and covered both end-users and security experts.

This chapter describes the investigation undertaken, explaining the survey undertaken
detailing its structure, respondents and mode of conduct and the results of interviews
undertaken. A complete sample of survey will be provided in Appendix A. After data
collection, the analysis of the results will be conducted. However, only the analysis of
survey questions which have a direct impact on framework development will be
conducted. An interview with security expert will be conducted to evaluate the
findings obtained from the survey. This chapter concludes by identifying key findings
as obtained from the survey.

6.2 Audiences
Since the survey aimed at understanding the roles users play in computer systems
security and how different awareness programmes assists in educating users, therefore
the targeted respondents included security experts and any computer specialists.
However, since a security awareness programme aims at educating all employees in an
organisation, end-users also were included. Security experts and computer specialists
were preferred because of their broad knowledge while end-users were preferred
because they are implicitly integrated in security learning cycle.

Experts were thereafter categorised into two categories, academicians and industrial
experts. Academicians include university lecturers in Information/Computer systems
security modules, and researchers from different computer science research groups
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while industrial experts include experts and consultants from security and information
technology industry. University lecturers in computing department who teach modules
other computer systems security were considered to be end-users so as to reduce the
biasness of the results. Since the survey was about users’ involvement then we need
input from them. We need to know their views about their involvement in security.

6.3 Methodology
This survey was done in late June and majority of respondents were academicians with
a very small portion of industrial experts. Therefore there were difficulties in
physically reaching them since majority of them were out for vacation. This explains
to why the questionnaire option was preferred. Although there were interviews over
the phone, but these only targeted to a specific small number of security experts.

The survey was based on two questionnaire approaches; offline and online surveying.
The first approach was conducted into two phases; the first phase was through physical
distribution of questionnaires during the 3rd ICITST seminar which was held on 23rd
June 2008 at Dublin Institute of Technology. Moreover, the second phase was based
on physical distribution of questionnaires to academicians and experts of different
organisations in Tanzania.

The second phase was done when the author was in a short break in Tanzania. Many
questionnaires were distributed in different organisations. While in Tanzania, the
author was tempted to extend the survey to Kenya and Uganda so as to get the feel of
how developing countries perceive the issue of computer systems security. This
extension was so potential in this project. The ICITST seminar was one of the potential
samples for this survey because it involved experienced researchers and experts in
computer science and security from different countries all over the world.

The second approach of the survey was an online survey. This approach was both
effective and convenient. It was effective in the sense that it broadens the accessibility
of respondents, and convenient because it did not insist on immediate presence of the
respondent. Respondent can find and fill in the questionnaire at their time. This
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approach had three phases; creating respondents’ mailing list, online survey posting
and last but not least, survey participation invitation.

In the first phase, two different categories of mailing list were created. The first
category was made from academic staff list and second from supporting staff list of
institutions and universities of Ireland. After mailing list creation, the survey questions
were posted online through an online survey tool, Group Surveys (http://beta.groupsurveys.com). This was a very useful tool, it allows respondent to fill in the
questionnaire into phases and provides analysis capabilities. Through this tool, a
respondent can partially fill in the questionnaire and proceed with it later.

After posting the questions online, the last phase was invitation. The approach was to
send email to the mailing list created during phase one of this approach by introducing
the host of the survey, explaining its aim and purpose thereafter requesting the
respondent’s participation in the completion of the survey. The link to the survey was
included in the invitation e-mail allow the invitee to access the survey. However, to
expand the number of respondents, mailing list from computer security relevant
research groups were included. These included IS World and Security Focus discussion
forums.

6.4 Questionnaire Design
Imagine you are given a coffee machine without a user manual and/or being told its
purpose. Will it be useful to you? The answer to this question is so obvious, it would
not be of useful because you do not know what is it for and how to operate it. Likewise
with surveys; without explaining its structure, it might lead to misjudgement of survey
results. This section aims at explaining the structure of the survey by going into details
of each question explaining why it was preferred and its contribution on the research
problem.

Although there were two versions of questionnaires for this survey, only the final
structure will be explained since the only difference is the addition of questions. The
analysis of the initial offline survey provided some interesting results which prompted
the inclusion of additional questions in the second version to further the investigation
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and strengthen the results. This section will not only introduce the reader with the
structural understanding of the survey, but also acts as a guideline on how to
effectively design and construct surveys.

The first section of the survey aimed at understanding the respondents and the nature
of their organisation. Different organisations have different needs of security measures.
The need of security measures in agricultural and financial organisations is completely
different. Moreover, the size of the organisation is also an essential parameter. The
larger the size, the higher the accessibility of awareness programmes is required. The
first two questions of this section were essential in determining the level of security
measures and awareness programmes each organisation requires.

The world is made up of different cultures. The level at which technology is being
utilised in developed countries is quite different with those of third world countries.
This subsequently affects the intensity of computer security. In developed countries,
almost every operation is computerised, whereas in third world countries almost
everything is manually processed. This concludes that to be effective in computer
security, one should understand the culture of that organisation first. Questions 3 and 4
of this section therefore aimed to ascertain the culture the respondent was from so that
the impact this had on their answers could be investigated.

Since this was an open survey, which means it was accessible to almost everyone who
was either a member of intended discussion forum or mailing list, filtering was the
only way to differentiate between experts and end-users. This was accomplished by
question 5 and 6 which ascertained the respondents’ background. This approach was
useful during the analysis phase where the results obtained from experts were extracted
and analysed separately. It was essential to separate results from experts so as to
increase the reliability of the survey results. Since security experts and end-users
differs in computer security understandability therefore it was important to be able to
identify the opinions of those experts who know about security while being able to
identify issues which may be barriers to those who are trying to learn, the end-users.

Further, question 7 and 8 aimed at further assessing the security qualifications of the
respondent asking whether a respondent has any security professional qualification.
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Professional qualifications are popular within the software industry. Certification
programmes aim to provide an education in a set of issues where the achievement of a
certification indicates that the holder is aware of these issues to a particular standard. It
is therefore becoming increasingly popular. However, as was noted earlier, the need
for security measures differs with the nature of organisations. In organisations A, the
need for security professional qualification(s) might not be necessary but it might be a
significant requirement for organisation B. So, it is necessary to determine the
requirement of security professional qualification(s) so as to cover the need for
including number of links for security professional bodies.

Although in some organisations, security professional qualification(s) might be a
significant requirement for security role, but might not be very useful in improving
computer security. Moreover, even those organisations which security professional
qualification(s) is not mandatory; it might happen some of security roles have security
professional qualifications. The question arise, are they going to be recognised? This
explains why question 9 and 10 were included in this survey; to test the usefulness of
security professional qualifications in improving organisations’ computer security.

Before rushing into designing of security awareness programme, one should assess the
current computer security situation of that organisation. This can be done by
determining the engagement of end-users in computer security and the effort that have
been put forward by that organisation on maintaining its information resources. This
was accomplished by questions that fall under section two of the survey. Question 1, 4,
15, 16, 17 and 18 of this section focused on determining the effort of organisation in
computer security whereas the remained questions focused on determining end-users
engagement in computer security.

Although, it is very common that every organisation must have security policies in
place to educate users on their roles and standards of doing their tasks, in practice this
is different. The initial survey experienced this problem because it the expectation was
that that every organisation operating in today’s global environment would have
security policies. However this proved not to be the case since in many cases,
respondents most commonly in third world countries, ignored the question. This led to
further investigation to find out why and it proved that it was not a valid to assume that
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most organisations have some security policies. So an additional question was included
in the online survey to determine whether the organisation has security policies or not
so that the responses could be analysed differentiating between those respondents who
worked in organisations with existing policies and those without.

Apart from Systems Administrators, there are some roles in organisation that require
computer systems’ administrative privileges to accomplish their tasks. Therefore, it is
essential to determine what these roles are and whether they need special treatments in
security awareness programme. Security policy alone would not be effective if this
proved to be the case. Holders of such roles need to be educated on how to
hygienically handle their privileges, like not to stay online where unnecessary and to
avoid installation of applications without knowing their source. This explains why
question 3 and 4 were included in the survey.

As it was mentioned previously, security policy defines computer security
requirements and security awareness programme(s) informs users about those
requirements and provide them with necessary skills to accomplish them. Therefore,
through security policy adherence, current organisation’s status of computer security
and the successfulness of security awareness programme(s) can be determined.
Question 15 and 16 attempted to determine this.

Security policies do change. A policy might be useful today but might not be useful
tomorrow. Therefore, evaluating users’ adherence alone it is not enough measurement
for the success of information security. This emphasises the necessity of measuring the
effectiveness of security policies. However, this contradicts with organisation’s
rewarding schemes. In some organisation, information security is achieved not because
of security policies but due to motivation of the individuals involved. Question 17 and
18 attempted to ascertain information to allow these parameters to be explored.

6.5 Survey Results Analysis
After completion of the survey, both offline and online, the process followed was
survey data analysis. From the data obtained, many interest findings were discovered.
This section describes the analysis process undertaken, presenting the results of the
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survey and the analysis undertaken. Only results from questions that contribute to the
development of the framework will be described.

Although the structure of offline and online questionnaires differ, the online structure
will be used as a guideline for the description of the analysis process. This section is
divided into four phases; ICITST seminar’s analysis, Tanzanian’s analysis, Online
analysis and combination of all surveys. Experts are expected to be more
knowledgeable in the area. Conducting their results’ analysis separately could have
much contribution to the framework development. To accomplish this, question 5 and
6 of section 1 will be used.
6.5.1 IC ITST Seminar survey results
In this survey, 30 copies of questionnaire were distributed during the registration
session of the ICITST conference. Respondents were given freedom to complete the
questionnaire at their convenience during the conference which lasted for four days.
This survey was not so successful as compared to the one done in Tanzania. Until the
final day of the seminar, only eight copies were returned which summed up to a total
of 27%. However, since majority of attendants were security experts, the results
obtained are still of valuable.


Respondents based on country

From the analysis conducted based on question 3 of section 1, majority of respondents
were from Ireland, United Kingdom and Jordan each with 25% respondent rate. Other
countries include Netherlands and United States of America with 12.5% respondent
rate. These respondents were very useful, not only because they are experts in the area,
but also they represent developed countries that are more advanced in technology.
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Figure 14: Distribution of Respondent based on Country

Although there were many categories of roles, all respondents opted for “Other IT
Personnel” because there was no role for “Computer/IT Researcher”. However, their
results were still valuable because majority of them are researchers in the field of
computer and information security. This was the weakness that was encountered in the
offline survey but it was fixed in the online survey by including the “Computer/IT
Researcher” role category in the option.


Security awareness programme approaches

The analysis of question 2 of section 3 reveals that majority of organisations with a
total of 40% engage the use of email as their means of sharing information about
security relevant issues. “Face-to-face” and “Presentation” approaches follow with
20% less from “Email” approach. Other approaches include “Web-based” and “Poster”
with 6.7% approaches.
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Figure 15: Distribution of Awareness approaches

However, this contradicts with an industrial opinion about the use of email as the way
of communicating sensitive information (http://kmjeff.blogspot.com/). Apart from the
fact that humans tends to ignore emails, especially from officemates, email tends to be
so meshed up when there are many senders. When inbox is full it is difficulty to search
through all the emails just to look for one particular email. Moreover, it is difficulty to
track the progress of security awareness programme.


Breadth of awareness programme

The analysis of question 3 and 4 of section 3 shows that majority of respondents do not
know whether their security awareness programme goes beyond the awareness of
security policies. Only 28.57% of respondents were confident about their security
awareness programme did go beyond the awareness of policies. Interestingly, even an
experienced respondent with 6 – 9 years range of experience, and CISM and CISSP
security professional qualifications, opted for a “No” option.
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Figure 16: Breadth of Security Awareness Programme

This concludes that majority of organisations do not consider awareness programme(s)
as the tool for educating users on computer security threats instead they consider it as
the tool for informing users about organisational security policies.

Summarising the findings from this analysis, majority of organisations considers email
facility as effective means of communicating and sharing information concerning
security requirements. Moreover, their perceptions on security awareness programme
are limited to security policies and not as the tool for educating users about the trend of
computer threats and how to combat against them.
6.5.2 Tanzanian’s survey results
In this survey 50 copies of questionnaires were distributed in education, government
agencies, telecommunications and financial organisations. The survey lasted for one
week from the distribution date. It was a very successful because out of 50 copies, 32
copies of completed questionnaires were collected which accounted to 64% of the
whole survey results. Only 3 copies of questionnaires were damaged due to concept
misunderstood, hence total percentage of survey results remained to be 58%.

However, the results obtained were quiet different with the results obtained in the
previous analysis. The results revealed a huge gap of computer security perception
between developed and developing countries. Therefore, the survey was extended to
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include Kenya and Uganda to investigate how developing countries perceive the issue
of information systems and computer security. Though it turned out their information
security perception differs with developed countries, the results obtained contributed a
lot in this project. It raised the issue of technological maturity to be thought when
preparing awareness program which was not considered previously.


Information security roles and experience

The analysis of question 5 and 6 reveals that majority of respondents fall under 1 to 5
years category with a very little exception of 6 to 9 and 10 to 15 years categories.
Moreover, majority of respondents opted for “Other IT Personnel” role category, with
only six respondents on “Systems Administrator” role and one respondent on each of
the remaining roles. However, this implies that majority of respondents were not
necessarily experienced in computer security since “Other IT Personnel” might include
any other roles like help desk, software developers, graphic designers and many alike.
This is the same problem experienced in the previous survey.

Figure 17: Respondents' experience based on role and qualification

These results could be completely different if the question was to ask for specific
computer security roles without including “Other IT Personnel” role category, or to ask
the respondents if they were familiar with computer security prior to answering this
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question. This indicates the deficiencies of this survey that need to be addressed when
designing other survey of this nature.

Nevertheless, an interesting finding can be obtained from the distribution of security
professional qualifications. Although majority of respondents fall under “Other IT
Personnel” category, only one respondent, who happened to be IT Security Supervisor,
had security professional qualification. With remained two security professional
qualifications to “IT Manager” and “CSO/CISO” categories. Moreover, only one
respondent opted for “CSO/CISO” category with none in “CIO/CTO” category. This
concludes that computer security in Tanzania has not yet been considered as an issue.


Users’ involvement with computer systems

Moreover, analysis was done to determine the use of computer systems in Tanzania.
Based on question 1 of section 1 and question 3 of section 2, it was discovered that
majority of organisations involve their employees in using computer systems with 44%
“High” and “Medium” categories . This can be graphically represented in figure
below. However, this should not be confused with technological maturity of
organisations. Majority of organisations in Tanzania are still operating manual. They
use computers for office operations like report writing and very simple applications.

Figure 18: Distribution of end-users in operating computer systems

98

Contrary, the results could be completely different if the question asked the number of
operational information systems and/or their rate of connectivity to internet. Tanzania
is still in automation level of technology. Based on an informal pilot survey, banking
and telecommunications industry are termed to be the most successful in technology.
However, there is no any transaction which are performed online except for balance
enquires. These results have affinity with the results obtained by a telecommunications
survey conducted by International Telecommunications Union (ITU 2007). Their
result revealed that Africa has 2.5% internet subscribers compared to other continents
such as Europe with 29%.


Applicable security awareness approaches

The analysis of question 2 of section 3 shows that email, presentation and web-based
are the common forms of awareness programmes with email as the highest with 43%.
Thereafter it follows “Presentation” with 23% and the third approach is web-based
with 20%. Other approaches include “Face-to-face” with 8%, “Posters” with 5% and
3% without security awareness programme at all.

Figure 19: Distributions for security awareness approaches

However, the results could be completely different if an option of “Not Applicable”
was included. This is because the most common query posed by respondents was what
was meant by security user awareness programme. This implies that majority of
respondents chose “email”, “web-based” and “presentation” approaches because there
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were common terms to them. Another interesting finding is the 3% of “none” option.
This again emphasises the low maturity of information security in Tanzania.


Information security perception

The analysis on question 1, 2 and 3 of section 1 against of that of question 1 of section
2 reveals that the issue of computer security in Tanzania is very far behind hence many
organisations does not take it as a serious issue. The results represented in the graph
below shows the distribution of security professional certifications in different
organisation.

Figure 20: Distribution of Security Professional Qualifications in Organisations

Only three respondents from government, education and telecommunication have
security professional qualifications. Moreover, as it was shown in Figure 17, only one
respondent have security role i.e. “CSO/CISO”. This concludes that many organisation
in Tanzania they does not see the potential of information security.

Findings obtained from this survey, triggered a pilot survey to other developing
countries including Kenya and Uganda. These countries were picked because they are
near to Tanzania and more importantly they present a clear picture of developing
countries. Due to time limit, the approach employed was to contact key personnel in
computing department of different organisation and ask general questions based on the
results obtained from Tanzania.
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Surprisingly, the answers received were very much in line with the results obtained
from Tanzania. This again aroused curiosity for finding what reasons are behind this.
Furthermore, another survey was conducted. The approach was to browse different
universities’ web pages searching for modules that teach students on information
systems security. The survey discovered that only few universities teach modules
similar to information security. The majority of these courses are offered in training
centres which is a bit expensive for an average person.
6.5.3 Online survey results
The aim of this project was to develop a framework that will leverage KMS to improve
security awareness. It is clear from the aim that this framework is not a closed
framework tightly to a specific country and/or organisation. Therefore all possible
input must be considered prior to its designing. To accomplish this, the questionnaire
was posted online so as to gain different views from different countries all over the
world. The survey had large input to the project because many of the audience who
responded are security researchers and experts from different countries.

The survey lasted for three weeks period. 111 respondents responded to the survey and
43 of questionnaires were fully completed with 22 respondents who did not replied at
all. The survey was very successful because the response rate was very high with many
countries which are regarded as benchmark for information security. Country like USA
which is second high in the chart is far away in information security. Therefore from
this huge number of response, useful information can be obtained.


Respondents by country

The analysis of respondent based on countries as shown in Figure 21, the top three
countries are Tanzania with 22.6% followed by United States of America with 20.2%
and 14.3% for United Kingdom. Other countries which are in top five include Ireland
with 13.1%, and Malaysia and Singapore with 3.6%. The remaining countries which
also participated in the survey include Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, Indonesia,
Iceland, Pakistan, France, India, Singapore, Mexico and Romania, Germany, Nigeria,
China, Hong Kong, Canada and Portugal.
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Figure 21: Respondents by country

As shown in the chart, many countries participated in the survey. This shows the
reliability of the results and hence provides good inputs for the design of the
framework which is the objective of this project. Besides the reliability of the results,
the survey also proves to be interesting to win such a huge number of respondents in a
very short period.


Users’ involvement

The analysis of question 2 of section 2 reveals that majority of organisation ignores
users’ involvement in establishing security policies. As shown in Figure 22, majority
of respondents agreed opted for “Medium” category with 26.8% then followed by
24.4% of “Very low”. On the other hand, only few of respondents opted for “Very
high” and “High” categories with only 4.9% while others opted for “Low”, “Very low”
and “Don’t know” categories with 17.1%, 14.6% and 7.3% respectively. Statistically,
only 36.6% of respondents consider users’ involvement in establishing security
policies. Therefore, 65.4% of respondents they either take it for granted or do not
consider it at all.
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Figure 22: Users' Involvement in Policy Establishment



Security adherence

Users’ involvement in security policy establishment is directly proportional to their
adherence. As the shown in Figure 23 the values for users’ involvement during security
policy establishment is directly proportional to the values for security policy
adherence. Therefore, this emphasises that users’ involvement in security policy
establishment determines their adherence with security policies.

Figure 23: Relationship between users' involvement and policy adherence
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6.5.4 General survey results
The previous analysis focused on analysis of individual surveys. However, since the
aim of the survey was to investigate the roles users play in computer security and the
effect of security awareness programme in educating users, it is now plausible to
combine the results from each survey and analyse so as to gain the general results.


Poor user involvement in security decisions

As previously results revealed, user involvement in security relevant decisions is very
poor. The analysis was done based on the question asking if the respondent’s
organisation considers users in establishing security policies. As shown in figure 24,
majority of respondent are between “Medium” and “Low” categories, with only total
of 8% of “High” categories. On the other hand, as shown on graph (b), users’
involvement is directly proportion to their adherence with security policies. This
concludes that majority of organisations involved in the survey does not consider
users’ participation in security related decisions and thus it has impact on the
successful of organisational computer security.
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Figure 24: User involvement in security decisions



Computer security perception

Comparison of survey results from Tanzania and those collected from ICITST revealed
the difference in computer security perceptions between developing and developed
countries. The results revealed that Tanzania which represents developing countries is
very poor in understanding computer security. As it is shown in figure 25, the
comparison of security qualifications, roles and government involvement between
developing and developed countries revealed there is a gap of 1:3 ratios in computer
security. The results show the respondents from developing countries have only 4
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security qualifications out of 48 respondents, inclusive 19 respondents from online
survey. On the other hand, developed countries have 12 security qualifications out of
65. Moreover, comparison of government involvement in security issues reveals the
gap between developing and developed countries. As shown in figure 25, government
involvement in computer security is poor compared with developing countries.

Figure 25: The gap of computer security between developed and developing countries

Moreover, based on the question that was asking respondents about whether there is
security awareness programme in their organisations, results confirm the gap between
developed and developing countries. The gap between “Yes” from respondents from
developed countries is twice as the response from developing countries. Moreover, the
number of respondents who did not know whether there is security awareness
programme in place is high for developing counties compared to developed countries.
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Email as a major tool

Both the results from all surveys show that email is a leading approach for security
awareness programme. As shown in the figure 26, for general results email is the
leading approach followed by web-based which is 8.09% less than email approach.

Figure 26: Distribution of security awareness approaches



Narrowness of security awareness programme(s)

The analysis was done based on the question asking whether security awareness
programme(s) goes beyond the awareness of security policies. As it can be seen from
the diagram 27, majority of respondents opted for “Yes” with 49.18% followed by
“No” option with 36.07% and finally with “Don’t know” with 15%. However, thought
the results shows majority of organisations consider awareness programmes to go
further, but in totality the result is poor because it is only 49.18% of the whole results.
This concludes that security awareness has not yet been seriously practiced.
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Figure 27: Breadth of Awareness Programmes

6.6 Supporting interviews

6.6.1 Interview design
The aim of this survey was to investigate the roles users play in computer security and
the effort of the current security awareness programme into educating users in security
related issues. The survey was successful with reasonable number of participants
whom majority were security experts. Many findings were obtained. However, since
these are the inputs for the development of the framework, therefore it is plausible to
evaluate them prior to their applicability. Therefore, the primary aim of these
interviews was to evaluate findings as obtained from both literature review and the
survey as well.

The questions of the interview were derived from findings both from literature review
and survey. Six questions were derived, each covered findings from both literature
review and survey. A complete structure of interview is provided in appendix B. The
interview questions were then tested for completion time by imitating the interview
session with colleague. The resulted completion time was 45 minutes.
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6.6.2 Interviewee contributions


1st Interviewee

The interview was conducted on August 25th 2008 with a former security expert in
computer security which lasted for one hour. To be in the same line with interview
questions, the interview began with briefly explanation of the project aim. Thereafter,
the interviewee initiated a general discussion of the structure of the interview questions
where some comments were noted. After a general discussion of interview questions,
the main theme of the discussion was initiated where the interviewee commented in a
number of things both general for the dissertation and specific for interview session.

The initial comments which were noted were based on the look and feel of interview
questions. Among these comments was the generic nature of the interview questions.
The interviewee commented that the questions are too general and they should focus
on specific issue. For instance in question one, the interviewee noted that the question
did not state what type of users the question is focusing on. Furthermore, the
interviewee commented on the clarity of the questions and suggested for inclusion of
examples to give a clear picture of questions. For instance in question 1 and 2,
interviewee suggested including examples of policy and topic of material respectively.

Following the interview theme, in question 1 and 2, interviewee agreed with argument
but with exceptions that only the management and/or IT personnel who participate in
policy making and/or security awareness building process, respectively, should be the
last decision makers. The interviewee commented that there are negotiatable and nonnegotiatable security policies. For non-negotiatable security policies users must be told
and follow while negotiatable users can discuss about the establishment of the policy.

However, in Knowledge Management context the author believe that regardless of the
nature of the policy, employees’ engagement in establishing security policies is
essential for its success. This is because employees will feel a sense of being respected
and not just dragged like machine. This will make the employees to have trust with
their management and thus motivates them on opening up for new idea.
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“Engagement communicates management’s respect for individuals and their ideas.”
(Kim & Mauborgne 2003)

Proceeding with the interview, in question 3 and 5 the interviewee also agreed with the
argument that both organisational culture and security culture are crucial factors to be
considered. However, the interviewee argued that these cultural factors go head-tohead with domain of the organisation. Therefore, a clear understanding of the domain
determines the cultural behaviours of the organisation. This comment was inline with
author’s view.

In the general comments of the dissertation, interviewee commented on the clarity of
the dissertation where further emphasises were on the scope and relevance of literature
review and definitions of factors.

6.7 Summary of findings

6.7.1 Poor user involvement in securit y decisions
The analysis shows, see figure 24, that users involvement in security policy
establishment is poor and thus it has direct impact on users’ adherence with security
policies. Therefore, this reveals that if users could be involved in security related
decisions, security policy compliance could increase and hence increase in computer
security in general.
6.7.2 Computer securit y perceptions
The analysis of the results from both surveys reveals a gap of computer security
perception between developing and developed countries, see figure 25. This is
apparently because of differences technological infrastructure maturity. Unlike in
developed countries, majority of organisations in developing countries are still
operating manually (Bugada 2005). Therefore, this will subsequently reduce computer
threats and hence its consciousness.
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6.7.3 E-mail as a major securit y awareness approach
The survey reveals that e-mail has dominate as a major channel for disseminating
security awareness materials with a little exception on web-based approach, see figure
26. This explains why majority of security awareness programme fails. This is because
email is not a convenient tool for facilitating collaboration.
6.7.4 Narrowness of awareness programme(s)
The survey results reveals that majority of organisations does not consider awareness
as a broad means of educating their employees on security issues more than security
policies, see figure 27. This explains why the number of security break-ins increases.

6.8 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at describing security awareness survey. In section two,
explanation of survey audiences was conducted which included both security experts
and end-users. The survey was based on both online and physical distribution of
questionnaires. In physical distribution, questionnaires were distributed in ICITST
seminar which was held in Dublin Institute of Technology and in Tanzania. The results
obtained from questionnaires distributed in Tanzania triggered the extension of the
survey to other developing countries including Kenya and Uganda.

The description of survey designing was conducted in section four where the aim of
each question was explained. The analysis of survey results was conducted in section
five where each survey was separately analysed and finally combined. Among the
findings of the survey is the gap of security perception between developed and
developing countries. Other findings include poor users’ involvement, dominance of email in security awareness, and the shallowness of security awareness programmes.
The following chapter describes the development of a framework and prototype
implementation.
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7

KMS-SAWA

FRAMEWORK

AND

PROTOTYPE

IMPLEMENTATION

7.1 Introduction
All the way from chapter 2 of this dissertation to chapter 5, the research presented has
been focused on establishing the foundations for the heart of the project described in
this dissertation which is to investigate how KMS could be useful in improving
security awareness in an organisation context. From the research documented in
previous chapters, a framework to use KMS to improve security awareness has been
developed that leverages the findings obtained.

This chapter discusses the

development of this framework.

The chapter starts by discussing key factors which were found to influence the creation
of a KMS to support security awareness. Further the chapter extends the findings not
just to the development of a KMS but to the development of a security awareness
programme in any form. The chapter discusses the iterative development of KMSSAWA framework. The chapter then moves on to discuss the implementation of a
prototype KMS for security awareness using Wiki technology and concludes by
presenting the evaluation of this prototype and drawing conclusions on the overall
usefulness of the premise of the project described in this dissertation .

7.2 Factors for KMS implementation for security awareness
In this dissertation the determination of organisation’s technological maturity, security
culture, and organisational culture have been identified as crucial factors for successful
implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. This section focuses on
discussing each of these factors by going into details on determining the criterion for
their categorisation.
7.2.1 Technological maturit y
From the findings obtained from the survey results, it is clear that technological
maturity of an organisation determines the consciousness of computer security.
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Technological maturity defines the advancement in computer technology in an
organisation or any area where it is applicable. The survey results revealed the gap of
computer security perceptions between developed and developing countries.
Therefore, since the framework is an open framework, it is plausible to determine the
technological maturity of the organisation prior to building process of security
awareness programme.

Most of previous approaches overlooked the necessity of determining the
technological advancement of an organisation with the assumption that all
organisations are well established in technology. However, this is not the picture of
third world countries. As it was noted previously, in third world countries, computers
are mainly used for office operations with limited internet access for communications
purposes. Although there are few organisations such as financial institutes, government
and telecommunications which are said to be advanced in technology, but still many of
their tasks are manual carried.

However the challenge remains on how to determine organisation’s technological
maturity level. Fortunately, this process can be carried out just like requirements
analysis phase of software development life cycle. Therefore, normal techniques for
data collection, such as interview, observation, survey and many alike, can be applied
in this phase and come up with useful information. However, the problem still persists,
after obtaining for instance the number of applications that are operational and their
categories, how can someone categorise between high and low technological
maturities?

By itself, developing a criterion for determining the level of technological maturity in
organisations is enough title for the MSc. Dissertation. It requires an extensive
research on how different organisations perceive the potentiality of computer
applications in hand and how should they categorise applications based on their
usability. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation this issue will be ignored and
considered as a future work for this project.
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7.2.2 Organisational securit y culture
Understanding the level of technological maturity provides a clear picture of computer
security perceptions of an organisation. However, the analysis of organisational
security culture is crucial prior to the implementation of KMS for security awareness
programme. Organisational security culture defines organisation’s initiatives toward
computer security. These initiatives include encouragement of security collaboration
events, motivation schemes for practicing good security principles and users’
engagement in security related decisions. The survey results shows majority of security
awareness programmes fail because they ignore the cultural component. It is illusion to
deal with human elements without considering their intuitions.

However, the challenge here is not on how to measure the level of security culture
within organisation, the challenge is on how to measure their successfulness. What is
interested in this factor is on how current security initiatives help in minimising
computer threats and not how many initiatives are currently running. It is possible to
have many security initiatives but with poor results in computer security, which is the
focal point for their existence. Therefore it is crucial to determine how effective these
initiatives are prior to building awareness programme.

The level of organisational security culture can be measured by quantifying current
security initiatives of the organisation. Contrary, the effectiveness of security culture
can be measured by the number of computer security break-ins before and after the
initiation of the initiative. The decrease of computer security break-ins indicates the
successfulness of security culture and vice-versa. Therefore, the higher the decrease
rate of security break-ins the higher successful of initiatives so is the higher the level of
security culture and vice versa.
7.2.3 Organisational culture
The organisation’s technological maturity level and organisational security culture
determines the level of implementing security awareness programme. However,
explanation of the level of security awareness programme implementation is beyond
the scope of this section. This section only focuses on the description of organisational
culture in successful implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. This
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factor is in line with the first phase of building security awareness programme as
explained in chapter 3. In this context, organisational culture defined by the rules,
procedures, standards, values and mode of conduct of organisation’s operations.

As it was explained in chapter 4, understanding the nature of organisation is crucial in
determining the type of KMS to be implemented within the organisation. The
production type of an organisation with its market flexibility determines the type of
KMS to be implemented. Moreover, Desman (2002, pp.19-25) emphasises on
understanding the means of communications that are appropriate and applicable for
both the management and subordinates within the organisation. Therefore, all these
emphasise the necessity of understanding the culture that drives an organisation.
However, this is not about measuring its effectiveness or contributions in computer
security. This factor is for determining the “do’s” and “don’ts” of organisation.
Therefore, for determining the type of KMS to be deployed to a specific organisation,
a product-service model as described in chapter 4 will be used.

7.3 Initial KMS-SAWA framework
As mentioned previously, for an organisation to successfully leverage KMS to improve
security awareness programme it needs to fulfil three factors; technological maturity,
organisational security culture and organisational culture. Technological maturity
factor determines the level of computer security perception whereas organisational
security culture determines the initiatives for computer security improvement.
Organisational culture determines the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation.

The first two factors, technological maturity and security culture, acts as active factors
where they must be fulfilled for organisation to initiate security awareness
implementation process. Depending on their fulfilment, these factors determine the
implementation level of security awareness programme. On the other hand, the final
factor which is organisational culture determines the type of KMS to be implemented
for disseminating security related materials. However, since the framework will be
practically used, it was worthwhile to be evaluated by security experts (evaluator).
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Therefore, this section focuses on describing the evaluation process of the framework.
However, it should be noted this evaluation is just an initial evaluation focusing only
on the framework readability and applicability to the organisational context. Another
evaluation which will focus on usability of the framework will be explained in section
7.5. This evaluation session was based on oral interview where the author met face-toface with evaluator. The session started by briefly explanation of the framework and
how it intended to function. After the explanation, evaluator commented on some of
issues.

Figure 28: Initial KMS-SAWA Framework

As shown in figure 28, the framework, as notified by evaluator, lacks the correlation
between the implementation phases. That is, there is no a clear cut point showing the
incremental implementation if the organisation falls under the 1st phase of
implementation. Moreover, evaluator pointed out that there is no clarity on the scope
of pilot security awareness programme. Evaluator also pointed out that the framework
does not show the exemption of 3rd phase on pilot security awareness programme.
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Furthermore, the framework does not show the third factor to be considered for the
implementation of KMS for security awareness. Finally, the evaluator argued on the
complexity of categorising cultural issue within organisations. Therefore, the evaluator
suggested for reduction of organisational security culture into high and low categories.

On session adjourning, the evaluator commented on the applicability of the framework
in an organisational context with the conditions to amend all the deficiencies that were
identified during the session. All these comments were then worked on and are
reflected in the new framework, see figure 29.

7.4 KMS-SAWA framework descriptions
As mentioned previously, pre-evaluation of KMS-SAWA framework focused on
readability and applicability of the framework. Based on the comments from the
evaluator, new framework was developed to accommodate all comments. Therefore
the whole of this section will focus on describing the KMS for Security Awareness
(KMS-SAWA) framework, see figure 28.
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Figure 29: KMS - SAWA Framework

As it can be shown in figure 29, the framework has two layers of security awareness
programme(s); middle layer which is pilot security awareness programme and upper
layer which is the actual implementation of security awareness programme. Pilot
security awareness programme is a temporary strategy to ensure security awareness
within an organisation while it is in a transition period. However, this is with
exceptional for 3rd phase of implementation which goes directly to initiate the
permanent implementation of KMS for security awareness.

Moreover, depending on the implementation phase, organisations might require to
initiate a change management programme to introduce security culture prior to actual
implementation of security awareness programme (Alavi & Leidner 1999). Again
depending on implementation phase, this change management may target either both
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user categories; end-users, IT personnel and Managers, or only end-users and technical
staff. Much detail on change management programme will be discussed in section
7.4.1 and 7.4.2.

The approach used to describe the KMS-SAWA framework is based on its
implementation phases. Therefore, the 1st phase of implementation will be discussed
followed by 2nd phase then finalise with the 3rd phase. All components of the
framework, starting from bottom up, will be implicitly described in the descriptions of
each phase. However, it should be noted that the order of implementation phases is not
rigid. Depending on the levels of technological maturity and security culture of the
organisation, any phase can be implemented first.
7.4.1 1 s t Phase of implementation
As it is shown from the framework, figure 29, organisations that have low
technological maturity level fall under the first phase of implementation. As referred
from the survey findings, the level of technology has impact on computer security
perception and computer security in general. Therefore, building on this finding,
organisations that have low technological maturity are subsequently poor in security
culture. As it can be shown on the framework, organisations that fall in this category
must initiate a change management programme that aims at preparing end-users, IT
personnel and executives prior to the implementation of KMS for security awareness.
The aim of this change management is to educate them the benefits of computer
security and security culture as well so as in return they can be the champions into
engineering its adoption within the organisation.

Meanwhile a pilot security awareness programme must be initiated to temporarily
accommodate the needs in hand. This is the first form of security awareness
programme. Security awareness programme in this phase is in its simplest form that
focuses mainly on temporarily disseminating security related issues within the
organisation. However, if organisation in this phase chooses to concentrate with
managerial change management and ignore the other bit, then it will always remain in
phase one unless it changes its status of technological maturity. Therefore, for
organisation in this phase to implement KMS for security awareness must overcome
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phase 1 which is basically concerns with managers’ change management and thereafter
to undergo users’ and IT personnel change management.

Moreover, organisations that fall into a medium class of technological maturity, they
will then be tested for the level of security culture. If the organisations fall in the low
class of security culture, they will again fall into the first phase of implementation.
However, the difference from the previous first phase is that for this phase change
management programme is not as intense as the previous one. In this it is assumed that
managers have insights on why computer security is essential for their business.
7.4.2 2 n d Phase of implementation
The previous phase of KMS implementation focused on change management for both
users and IT personnel, and managers. In the second phase of implementation, the
focus is the change management for users and IT personnel. Therefore, organisations
that has medium technological maturity level and high level of security culture falls
under this phase. Meanwhile, the pilot security awareness programme needs to be
implemented to temporarily handle the current situation of disseminating security
related issues.

In this phase, a change management programme focuses on users and IT personnel. As
it was discovered from the literature review, the gap between users and security
personnel has impact on the successfulness of security awareness programme and
computer security as well. Therefore, the aim of this change management programme
is to resolve this gap that exists between security experts and users by explaining to
them the importance of knowledge sharing and their impact in security of corporate
information assets. Again this phase must fulfil the requirements of this phase prior to
actual implementation of KMS for security awareness programme.

Moreover, all organisations that have high technological maturity level but medium
security culture fall in this phase. However, change management in this is not as
intense as the previous category. In this, it is assumes that the gap between end-users
and security personnel is small and hence slight effort is required resolve the gap.
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7.4.3 3 r d Phase of implementation
If organisation has fulfilled all the requirements of phase one and two of
implementation then it enters into the third phase. In this phase, the actual
implementation of KMS for security awareness is initiated. As it was discovered in the
literature review, organisational culture is a central for the successful of security
awareness programme. Therefore, in line with this finding, prior to the implementation
of KMS for security awareness, organisational culture is considered in this framework.
Unlike technological maturity and security cultural factors, organisational culture is for
determination of the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation. Therefore, after analysing
cultural element of an organisation, normal process of building security awareness
programme, as described in section 3.4, follows in the context of KMS.

Meanwhile, for organisation that has not pass through phase one and two, it will be
tested for its technological maturity level. If the organisation fell in a high class it will
then be tested for the level of security culture. Again if the level of security culture is
high, then the organisation is declared to be mature enough to initiate the actual
implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. Therefore, this level skips
the change management phase and pilot security awareness.
7.4.4 Summary of wh y KMS-SAWA framework is a solution
This framework is useful in implementing KMS for implementing security awareness
programme because it addresses all previously identified problems for the failure of
successfulness of current security awareness programmes. From the literature review it
was pointed out that user’ involvement, poor material preparation and delivery,
ignorance of organisational and security culture are among the reasons to why current
security awareness programme fail. Moreover, survey findings also emphasised on
users’ involvement and consideration of computer security perceptions.

In resolving all these, the KMS-SAWA framework considers computer security
perceptions and security culture by including these as factors to determine the level of
change management. It is this change management that focus on resolving the gap
between users and security personnel. Therefore, by resolving this gap users’
involvement will definitely be increased and hence improves security awareness
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material preparations. Moreover, organisational culture is considered to resolve any
conflicts with organisation interests so as to define appropriate type of KMS to
facilitate security knowledge sharing between members of all levels. Therefore, by
deciding on the appropriate KMS for disseminating security awareness material,
greater response from users from all levels of management will be attracted.

7.5 Prototype implementation
As it was described in KMS-SAWA framework, for a successful implementation of
KMS on security awareness context, three phases of implementation must be
accomplished. However, this only depends on the level of technological maturity and
security culture of the organisation. Moreover, organisation type and the number of
users also determine the nature of KMS to be implemented for that particular
organisation.

This prototype was implemented to operate within any education institution with the
main concentration to lecturers as users. For the purpose of demonstration, this
prototype concentrated with the final phase of implementation with the assumption
that the underlying organisation is stable both in technology and security culture.
Therefore, effort is on disseminating security relevant material. Furthermore, due to
time limit and complexity nature of material preparation, the prototype was
specifically concentrating on educating users on phishing attacks.

The topic was chosen because it is the hot topic in security arena and mostly
susceptible to users (Sheng et al. 2007; Robila & Ragucci 2006). The type of KMS to
be implemented was determined based on the approach described in section 4.5.2. The
approach shows that all education institutions fall under “Service-based low volatile”
category (Kankanhalli et al. 2003). This implies that the nature of KMS to be
implemented for that particular category must be a hybrid of collaborative tools and
repositories.

Collaborative tools enable knowledge providers to share their understanding on
computer threats with knowledge seekers (Markus 2001). Moreover, repositories
enable knowledge intermediary to structure and store knowledge provided into useful
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format for future use. However, for the case of this prototype, users play dual roles;
both seekers and providers. They are seekers because they need to be aware on current
phishing techniques and how to deal with them.

Moreover, they are also knowledge providers because they direct computer security
personnel what need to be included in awareness materials. However, this is done
indirectly by letting users to rank the topics based on their importance. Therefore, from
the rank, computer security personnel will be able to understand users’ needs and tailor
the learning material to the needs. This approach not only attracts many users but also
improves material relevance and hence successfulness of security awareness
programme(s).

On the other side, computer security personnel play threefold roles; provider, seeker
and intermediary (Markus 2001). They are knowledge providers because they initiate
the learning process by providing users with knowledge of how to protect against
phishing attacks.

Moreover, they also play as intermediaries because they are

responsible for codification of their knowledge. Also they are knowledge seekers
because they are dependant on users to shape learning materials.

The prototype was implemented using an online free powerful Wiki tool, http://kmssawa.wetpaint.com. Most importantly, it has two unique features that were found to be
very useful to the implementation of this prototype; private accessibility and tracking
of changes. The tool enables a creation of a private account that can only be accessible
to the invited members. This resolved the risk of intruders gaining access as mentioned
in the proposal. Moreover it tracks every changes made on pages thus it is useful for
monitoring progress of the system.
7.5.1 Protot ype descriptions
As it was mentioned previously, this type of prototype is a collaborative KMS to assist
knowledge providers, seekers and intermediaries into capturing and sharing security
related knowledge. In this KMS there were two actors, members/users who were
academic staff and security administrator who was author, under a supervision of
security expert. Awareness materials were limited on phishing attacks because of time

123

limit and complexity nature of preparation. As it was mentioned previously,
knowledge capturing, storing and sharing of knowledge management processes, and
collaborative and repositories features of KMS are useful features for the success of
KMS in improving security awareness. Therefore, this section focuses on describing
SAWA-KMS prototype as a KMS system for improving security awareness in an
organisation based on knowledge storing and sharing.


Knowledge capturing and storing

As it was explained previously, knowledge capturing concentrates on knowledge
articulation and codification while knowledge storing concentrates with managing
knowledge content. In this prototype knowledge capturing takes two forms. Firstly, is
the direct codification of tacit knowledge from security administrator and codification
of explicit knowledge from other sources such as public awareness websites and other
security forums. Secondly and lastly, capturing of ongoing discussions to determine
and prepare security awareness material.

Capturing tools provided by this prototype is EasyEdit and Attachment capabilities as
shown in figure 29. EasyEdit allows member of the community to edit the page and
add the contents, as shown in figure 30, while Add attachment as shown on the drop
down list of figure 29 allows both a member and administrator to attach files for others
to share.

Figure 30: Knowledge capturing: Attachments
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com))
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Moreover, the prototype provides tagging feature that are useful in organising
knowledge contents, see figure 29. For instance in page1 you have included phishing,
email scam and identity theft as tags, and in page 2 you have included one of the
previous keywords as the tag, when you open either of the pages it the prototype will
include the link for the other page. Tags also help when searching for documents. You
just need to know the keyword. This is in fact a very useful feature of knowledge
storing because it reduce the time members searches for documents.

Figure 31: SAWA-KMS Phishing attacks page
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com))



Knowledge sharing

Other useful process of knowledge management that was highlighted as useful in using
KMS to improve security awareness is knowledge sharing. In this process, knowledge
sharing is accomplished by discussion forum facility of the prototype, see figure 32.
This facility collaborate members to share different views concerning computer
security. The good part of it, which differentiates it from email, is the track-keeping of
all previous discussions. It shows who edited the discussion and when it was edited
and what contents has been edited. All these are presented in one window called
“Dashboard”.
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Figure 32: SAWA-KMS threads dashboard
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com))

Alavi and Leidner (1999) ascertain that learning is a process of internalising and
converting information to knowledge. Therefore, besides the richness of knowledge
content, members’ awareness on the content is fundamental to speed up the learning
process. Having noticed this illness, the prototype deploys the push-pull strategy to
notify members by automatically sending an email about new “arrival” so that they
can retrieve at their convenient (Nonaka 2005, p.188).

Based on all these features and the considerations taken during its implementation
process, this prototype can definitely assisting in security knowledge sharing and
hence improve security awareness in an organisation.
7.5.2 Protot ype testing
Now that we know what the prototype is capable of, let us now analyse its applicability
in industry. As it was explained previously, the prototype has two actors; security
administrator and members. Security administrator for initiating and updating security
knowledge content and members for participating in security based discussions. The
testing of this prototype was done in two phases. Phase one was during the
implementation and in phase two is after the implementation.
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Testing during prototype implementation

This was ongoing testing where a number of security experts were invited with
administrative privileges of the prototype to monitor on the look and feel of security
materials. This included what should be included in what extent under what title. This
was a very effective way of presenting security content of the site to make members
finds what they expect and hence increase its usability.


Operational testing

This is the testing after completion of prototype implementation. In this phase
members were invited to participate in the prototype. A copy of invitation can be found
in appendix C. These members were specifically academicians from Africa so as to get
a clear feeling on the contribution of the prototype to their knowledge since Africa
symbolises developing countries which are very poor in computer security (ITU 2007).

7.6 Evaluation
Due to poor accessibility of internet services, users’ response was very poor. This can
evidently shown by the fluctuation shape of the activity diagram as shown in figure 34.
However, regardless the poorness of members’ accessibility, there are total number of
seven knowledge sharing events, see figure 33. This implies that, with time the
prototype could be more interactive and increase more knowledge sharing.
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Figure 33: Current Discussions
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com))
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Figure 34: Activity graph
(Adapted from (https://www.google.com/analytics/))

7.7 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at describing the development of a KMS-SAWA framework and
the implementation of a Wiki-based prototype. The framework is made up with three
factors based on the findings obtained from literature review and security awareness
survey. The explanation of these factors was provided in section two. The initial
framework was described in section three which was evaluated by security expert to
assess its readability and applicability. The evaluation was interview-based. Following
the recommendations from security expert, a complete framework was developed. The
description of a complete framework was provided in section four where difference
phases of KMS implementation were explained.

In section five, the description of Wiki-based prototype was provided. The description
of the prototype was based on knowledge capturing, storing and sharing processes of
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knowledge management as identified in chapter five. The EasyEdit and attachment
facilities of Wiki have been identified to facilitate knowledge capturing. Moreover, the
discussion forums and threads have been identified to facilitate knowledge sharing.
Both security experts and users were invited to test and evaluate the prototype. The
evaluation of the prototype was provided in section six. The following chapter
provides the summary of the project and identifying and the recommendation of future
work.
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8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction
Since now we are approaching to end of this dissertation, it is worthwhile having a
quick grasp of what was done up to this end. This chapter will detail the results,
conclusions and recommendations reached from the research conducted. The aim of
this project was investigate users’ awareness in security issues and the usefulness of
KMS in improving security user awareness thereafter to develop a framework that
leverages KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational context. From
this framework a prototype KMS was developed. This chapter will discuss the major
results of this project and also recommend future research needed to give a more
comprehensive overview of the issues addressed and findings of the project discussed
in this dissertation.

8.2 Research Definition & Research Overview
Security awareness is the key issue in the prosperity of organisations. Organisations
are heavily reliant on users for their operations and yet users are becoming more
susceptible to threat over time.

Though there are many technological control

measures, users’ co-operation is still of particular value. Organisations need to
seriously address human issues in security by building security learning environments
that will integrate security ethics in their daily operations.

The aim of the project was to investigate users’ awareness of computer security issues
and the feasibility of employing a KMS to improve security awareness in an
organisational context. Thereafter the aim was to develop a framework that leverages
KMS to improve security awareness in an organisational context. Finally this project
developed a Wiki-based KMS prototype based on the framework developed, which
was evaluated by both security experts and end-users with the security experts guiding
the development of the prototype while end-users were involved in evaluating the
prototype assessing the contribution of the KMS to improving their security
knowledge.
131

8.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge
Firstly and foremost the role of users in security and security awareness was identified
as the main research area of this project. The motive behind this is the increased rate of
security break-ins due to poor understanding of security standards. Following this,
KMS was identified as a possible solution to improve security awareness. The motive
behind choosing KMS is their success in improving organisation’s performance in
other knowledge areas.

In order to accomplish this, an extensive literature review on security and security
awareness area was undertaken to ascertain current key issues in an organisational
context. An extensive exploration of computer security was covered where the trend of
security threats and their control measures related to users were explored. Further, an
investigation of security awareness was conducted where different security awareness
approaches were explored. Although users’ involvement in security is an active
research area, the literature reveals that little effort has been invested in implementing
effective security awareness programmes to combat the problem.

Using the findings from the literature review, a survey was prepared targeting security
experts and organisational users, particularly academic users in Africa. The aim of the
survey was to investigate the role users’ play in computer security and the
contributions of current security awareness programmes in educating users. The survey
revealed both poor user involvement and limitations in use of security awareness
programmes. Moreover, the survey revealed the gap of security perceptions in
developed and developing countries.

The aim of this project was to develop a framework to leverage KMS to improve
security awareness within an organisation context. To accomplish this, an extensive
literature review was also conducted on Knowledge Management and KMS.
Knowledge Management involves many processes that have effects on successful
implementation of KMS. Therefore it was necessary to have a clear understanding of
these processes. Moreover it was necessary to conduct a literature review on KMS so
as to ascertain key features that could be leveraged for improving security awareness
within an organisation.
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Using this, an assessment of knowledge activities and features of KMS that were
suitable for improving security awareness was conducted. The assessment revealed
knowledge storing and sharing of Knowledge Management processes, and the
collaborative and repository features of KMS could be effectively used to improve
security awareness among employees within an organisation.

Based on the results from literature reviews and survey, a framework to leverage KMS
to improve security awareness was developed. The framework is an open framework
that can be deployed in any organisation as guidance in implementing KMS for
improving security awareness. The framework was evaluated by security experts and
proved to be applicable in an organisation context.

Following the evaluation of the framework, a prototype of KMS was developed using
Wiki collaborative tool. The aim of the prototype was to assess the usefulness of KMS
on improving security awareness. Many security experts and academic users,
specifically from Africa were invited to participate in the Wiki. Security experts were
invited to monitor the content of the Wiki during implementation, while users were
invited to assess the usefulness of KMS in raising their awareness on computer
security.

Although the time was limited, the results obtained reflect the positive effects on using
KMS to improve security awareness. Moreover, users from Africa were considered as
good system evaluators because, as the survey results revealed, they are not familiar
with computer threats. Therefore, KMS will have a direct impact on their knowledge
based on computer threats.

8.4 Experimentation, Evaluation and Limitation
The survey conducted as part of this research aimed to investigate the roles of users in
computer security and the effectiveness of security awareness programmes in
educating users on computer related issues. The survey was conducted in three phases.
Phase one was conducted during the ICITST seminar which was conducted on 23rd
June 2008. The second phase was conducted in Tanzania on mid July 2008 which
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resulted to an extension of the survey to other developing countries such as Kenya and
Uganda. The final phase was conducted online. Results obtained from the survey were
then evaluated by security experts through a face-to-face interview.

There are many countries that fall under categorisation of developing countries, but
due to time limit this survey only concentrated with three countries which are
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, for the developed countries only those
countries of the attendees of ICITST 2008 were considered. This limited the range of
countries considered during this research however the countries considered can be
considered suitable representatives of their categorisation.

Though the result obtained was enough for the development of the framework, still
there was limitation on the number of audiences. The response rate from audience was
relatively poor especially for online survey. Many audiences were invited to participate
in online survey but only few responded to the invitation and only very few completed
the survey. Moreover, the survey was conducted in mid June, which was during
summer break. Therefore it was difficult to distribute questionnaires and there were
many out-of-office notification emails.

Following the results obtained from literature review and survey, a framework was
developed to guide the implementation of KMS to improve security awareness in an
organisational context. The framework was then evaluated for its applicability by
security expert. Thereafter, a Wiki-based prototype was implemented to evaluate the
usefulness of KMS in improving security awareness. The prototype was both evaluated
by security experts and users from Africa. Security expert was for evaluation of the
prototype during its implementation while users were for evaluating the contribution
on their security related knowledge.

Due to limitation of internet accessibility, the response from users was relatively poor.
This led to limited results during evaluation. To prove the contribution of KMS in
improving security awareness a longer timeframe, potentially of years, is required.
However, the results obtained from this project have contributed sufficient results to
merit more investigation that have already been set a clear, validated pathway to
continue.
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8.5 Future Work & Research
There are many countries that fall under categorisation of developing countries, but
due to time limit this survey only concentrated with three countries which are
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Therefore, it is a recommendation of this project to
extend this investigation and include more countries that fall under developing so as to
gain more insights on their understanding of digital threats and their possible causes.

A valuable extension of this research would be to pick Tanzania as a sample country in
developing countries and implement a more functional Wiki based KMS that can be
accessible to the public so as to monitor their progress on gain new insights into
cultural aspects of digital threats and use the experience and findings to expand this
same strategy to other developing countries.

In an organisational context, it would be interesting to implement a similar Wikibased KMS in a series of organisations of various organisation, technical and security
cultures and to monitor the progress of users in gaining new insights on digital threats.
The findings of such research would be extremely useful in assessing the robustness of
the framework developed by this research and allow it to be extended to be applicable
and useful to a broader base. Thereafter it would be possible to extend this research to
recommend a series of KMS which could be implemented based on organisational
profiles.

8.6 Conclusion
This project highlighted the usefulness of KMS in improving security awareness in an
organisational context. From literature review and supporting survey responses, user
involvement in computer security decisions was discovered to be very poor. Based on
these findings, a framework was developed to guide the implementation of KMS in
improving security awareness. Thereafter a Wiki-based prototype was implemented to
evaluate the contributions of KMS in improving security awareness.

Moreover, the survey revealed the gap of computer security perceptions between
developed and developing countries. This has produced another area of potential
research which could be exploiting and extending the findings of this project.
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APPENDIX A

Security User Awareness Survey
(Online Questionnaire)

The aim of this survey is to investigate the potential roles users play in information systems
security and the effects security user awareness programmes have in educating users on relevant
security issues.
All your answers will be confidentially treated. Neither I, Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT)
nor any other third party will record your name, email address or any other details that might
lead to your identification.
On behalf of Dublin Institute of Technology, I would like to thank you for your contribution in
this important survey.

SECTION I
Organisational and Personal Information
Q1. What is the nature, primary business area of your organisation?
Agriculture

Construction/
Architecture/Engineering

Education

Information
Technology

Transportation/Logistics

Health

Financial/Banking

Entertainment

Government

Telecommunications

Others (Please specify):

Q2. How big is your organisation in terms of the number of employees?
Less than 100

100 – 499

500 – 999

1000 - 4999

5000 – 9999

More than 10000

Q3. In which country is your organisation located?
________________________________

143

Q4. In your opinion, how dependant is your organisation’s operations on computer systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q5. What best describes your role in your organisation?
CIO for Chief Information Officer, CTO for Chief Technology Officer, CSO for Chief Security Officer
and CISO for Chief Information Security Officer.

CIO/CTO

CSO/CISO

IT Manager

Other
IT Personnel

System
Administrator

Others (Please specify):

Q6. What is your experience in information systems security?
No experience

1 – 5 yrs

6 – 9 yrs

10 – 15 yrs

More than 15 yrs

Q7. Do you have any security professional qualification?
Yes

No

If your answer is “No”, please go to section two.
Q8. What security professional qualification(s) do you possess?
CISA

CISM

CISSP

ISSAP

ISSMP

ISSEP

CAP

SSCP

Others (Please specify):

Q9. With your security professional qualification(s), do you think it has helped to raise awareness of
your role in/responsibilities for security within your organisation?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:
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If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 10.
Q10.

In your opinion, how much has your security professional qualification(s) helped you to
contribute to your organisation’s information systems security?
Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

SECTION II
Roles of users in information systems’ security
Q1. Are there any security policies in your organisation?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 2, 4, 15, 16 and 17.
Q2. In your opinion, how involved are end-users in establishing security policies in your organisation?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q3. Is there any roles/designation other than administrators that requires computer administrative
privileges to perform their tasks?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 4.
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Q4. Does your organisation's security policy include policy on restrictions of applications installation??
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

Q5. In your opinion, how involved are users in operating your organisation’s computer systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q6. In your opinion, how involved are users in designing your organisation’s information systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q7. In your opinion, how involved are users in developing your organisation’s information systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q8. In your opinion, how involved are users in configuring your organisation’s information systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:
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Q9. In your opinion, how knowledgeable are end-users in social engineering computer attacks?
Don’t know

Not at all

Little
knowledgeable

Highly
Knowledgeable knowledgeable

Comments:

Q10. In your opinion, how knowledgeable are end-users on technical computer attacks?
Don’t know

Not at all

Little
knowledgeable

Highly
Knowledgeable knowledgeable

Comments:

Q11. Do you think it is necessary to educate end-users on information systems security matters?
Yes

No

Comments:

Q12. In your opinion, how knowledgeable are IT Personnel in information systems’ security attacks?
Don’t know

Not at all

Little
knowledgeable

Highly
Knowledgeable knowledgeable

Comments:

Q13. Do you think it is necessary to educate IT Personnel on information systems security matters?
Yes

No

Comments:
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Q14. In your opinion, how interactive are IT Personnel with end-users?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q15. In your opinion, how much do end-users adhere with security policies within your organisation?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q16. In your opinion, how much do IT Personnel adhere with security policies within your
organisation?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q17. In your opinion, how contributive security policies are in ensuring security of your organisation's
information systems?
Don’t know

Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q18. Does your organisation have any motivation scheme to attract end-users to practice good security
principles?
Yes
No

Comments:
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SECTION III
Impact of Security User Awareness Programmes
Q1.

Does your organisation have any security user awareness programme?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please go to question 10, 12 and 13.
Q2. What form of security user awareness programme(s) does your organisation practice?
Web-based

Posters

Presentations

Email

Face-to-face

Don’t know

Others (Please specify)

Q3. Does your organisation’s security user awareness programme(s) go beyond awareness of security
policies?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 4.
Q4. If it goes beyond awareness of security policies, do you think it matches with the dynamic nature
of computer security threats?
Yes

No

Don’t know

If yes, how?
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Q5.

Are IT personnel among the targeted users of your security user awareness programme(s)?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 7.
Q6. In your opinion, how responsive are end-users to security user awareness programme(s)?
Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q7. In your opinion, how responsive are IT Personnel to security user awareness programme(s)?
Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:

Q8. Does your security user awareness programmes contribute to a decrease in information systems
security attacks?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

Q9. In your opinion, how relevant are security user awareness materials to the targeted users within
your organisation?
Don’t know

Irrelevant

Moderate

Relevant

Comments:
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Q10. Does your organisation have computer security logging activated?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 11.
Q11. Does your security user awareness programme(s) material consider audited/logged information?
Yes

No

Don’t know

Comments:

Q12. In your country, are there any legal requirements for educating users in security issues?
Yes

No

Don’t know

If yes, please specify:

If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 13.
Q13. In your opinion, how much do legal requirements contribute to the security of organisation’s
information systems?
Not at all

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Comments:
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APPENDIX B

Q1. “Users’ involvement in security policy establishment is directly proportional to their
adherence with security policies.”
Comments:

Q2. What is your opinion on consulting users when preparing security awareness
materials?
Comments:

Q3. “Clear understanding of organizational culture determines the successfulness of
security awareness programme”
Comments:

Q4. “The level of computerization in an organization determines the understandability of
information security”
Comments:

Q5. “Clear understanding of organizational security culture determines the
successfulness of security awareness programme”
Comments:
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APPENDIX C

Hi all!
If you remember early July this year you helped me with the completion of security
awareness survey. It is my honor to acknowledge your contributions.
The survey was globally hence many countries participated including USA, UK, China,
Germany, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and many other countries.
However, it is sad to say from all these countries, including our neighbors Kenya and
Uganda, our country is the least in computer security understanding.
Following this finding, I have developed a collaborative Knowledge Management System
that will enable us to raise our understanding on computer security relevant issues. The
system is easy to use and allows you to add and edit any page as you wish, attach
documents and above all it enables us to conduct discussions.
This system is designed to operate in an organization environment. However, due to
computer security being a national problem, its accessibility with time, will eventually be
made public to citizens so as they can also participate in security knowledge sharing thus
raise their computer security awareness.
Though the system is in its dawn, with your cooperation we can make it successfully
inherited in our society. Participate in this motivation and you will eventually enjoy the
fruits of your participation. Let us join power and take this responsibility of educating our
nation about security issues.
You may wonder why there are so many dead links, but this is to make you play your
part. I have chosen my wing, so you choose yours or go along with me. I welcome your
comments about the page, and if you find anything that is missing you can add it.
Following this welcome note, I’ll send each member their login credentials individually.
Thanks very much.
Regards,
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